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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann §78-2a-3(2)(j) and Utah R. App. 
P. 4(a). Judge L.A. Dever entered an Order in Favor of Plaintiff, Counterclaim 
Defendant on May 20, 2009. Defendant, Third-Party and Counterclaim Plaintiff filed a 
Notice of Appeal on June 19, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Since 1991, Joel Evans ("Evans") has received Veterans disability benefits due to 
injuries he received in the Gulf War. After the Gulf War, Evans returned to his work at 
the Salt Lake City police department and over the next nine or ten years, incurred job 
related injuries which entitled Evans to disability benefits under the state Public 
Employees' Long-Term Disability Act ("PELTDA"). Salt Lake City offset the amount 
of Evans' benefits by the amount of his Veterans disability benefits. Does the PELTDA 
preclude Salt Lake City from reducing Evans' disability payments by the amount of his 
Veterans disability payments? Citation to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Record 
pp. 186-188, 850-855, 907-911, 988-990. This Court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness utilizing a de novo standard of review. Smith v. Four 
Corners Mental Health Center, 2003 UT 23, ^fl3, 70 P.2d 904, 909. 
2. Educators Mutual Insurance Association ("Educators"), Salt Lake City's 
disability plan administrator, imposed a 30-day administrative appeal deadline for Evans' 
to appeal Educators' denial of a portion of Evans' disability benefits. Evans missed that 
appeal deadline by 28 days and asked Educators to waive the delay but Educators refused 
3 
to do so. May Educators' insist on Evans' strict compliance to the 30-day appeal 
deadline? Citation to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Record, p. 175-178. This 
Court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness utilizing a de novo 
standard of review. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, 2008 UT 23,1fl3, 70 
P.2d 904, 909. 
3. Educators, as Salt Lake City's plan administrator and agent, sued Evans for 
repayment of benefits it claimed it had overpaid him. Evans counterclaimed and brought 
third party claims against Salt Lake City for breach of contract for its wrongful refusal to 
pay his disability benefits. The trial court granted Salt Lake City's motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that Evans was obligated to arbitrate claims against Salt Lake City. 
May Salt Lake City sue Evans for repayment on a contract obligation while also asserting 
Evans' counterclaims on the same contract must be arbitrated? Citation to Record to 
Preserve Issue on Appeal: Record, p. 535-540. This Court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness utilizing a de novo standard of review. Smith v. Four 
Corners Mental Health Center, 2008 UT 23,1(13, 70 P.2d 904, 909. 
4. Despite Educator's arguments that Evans did not timely appeal 
Educator's denial of his entitlement to "any occupation" disability benefits after the 
initial two year "own occupation" period of benefits, the trial court ruled that Evans did 
timely appeal. However, the trial court ruled that Educators did not have any obligation 
to consider evidence Evans offered in support of his appeal after the trial court's ruling. 
Was Educator's required to consider evidence presented by Evans after the court ruled 
that Evans' appeal on the "any occupation" entitlement to benefits was timely? Citation 
4 
to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Record, p. 658-662. This Court reviews the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness utilizing a de novo standard of review. Smith 
v. Four Corners Mental Health Center. 2008 UT 23, Tfl3, 70 P.2d 904, 909. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
The following are central to Evans' appeal: 
•The versions of Utah's Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Act in place in 2001 
(U.C.A. §49-9-101, et. seq.) and in 2002 (U.C.A. §49-21-101, et. seq.). 
•Utah Code Ann. §49-15-601; 
•U.C.A. §49-14-102(5) and (6); 
•10U.S.C. §1203; 
•Department of Defense Instruction Number 1332.18; 
•38U.S.C. §1110; and 
•U.C.A. §31A-21-312(2) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Joel Evans ("Evans") worked for almost twenty years as a police office for Salt 
Lake City Corporation ("Salt Lake City") until October of 2001 when he was no longer 
able to continue working due to a variety of disabling medical conditions. Salt Lake City 
provides long term disability benefits to its employees through a long term disability plan 
(the "Plan") which is administered by Educators. Educators concluded that Evans 
qualified for long term disability benefits due to his degenerative disc disease and chronic 
pain. However, Educators determined that Evans' disability was not caused by injuries 
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he sustained while on duty with the Salt Lake Police Department, which would have 
entitled Evans to payment of 100% of his pre-disability earnings as a disability benefit. 
Educators began paying Evans 66 2/3% of his pre-disability earnings as his monthly long 
term disability benefit. 
After Evans had been receiving disability benefits for a period of time, Educators 
began offsetting against the benefits it was paying the amount of money Evans received 
from Veterans disability benefits as a result of injuries he sustained while serving for the 
U.S. military in the Gulf War in 1991. Educators allowed 60 days from the date of its 
decisions for Evans to submit his first appeal. Evans timely appealed Educators' 
determination that his disability was not caused by a series of job-related injuries and he 
also appealed Educators' offset of his Veterans disability benefit. Educators maintained 
its position on both issues and allowed only 30 days for Evans to submit a second appeal. 
Evans' second appeal was submitted on the 58th day (rather than the 30th) day after 
Educator's first appeal denial and Educators refused to consider the second appeal. As a 
result of Evans' failure to submit a timely second appeal, Educator's maintained that the 
trial court had no ability to consider Evans' appeals on their merits. 
Educators later denied Evans' eligibility for long term disability benefits beyond 
the initial two year "own occupation" benefit period and again asserted that Evans did not 
appeal that denial in a timely way. Educators argued, based on its claim that Evans had 
not timely provided medical evidence, the trial court was precluded from considering 
Evans' claim on its merits. 
Educators brought suit in Third District Court against Evans for the amount it 
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claimed had been overpaid Evans due to Educators' failure to offset Evans' VA benefits. 
Evans filed a counterclaim against Educators, and a third party complaint against Salt 
Lake City, alleging that he was entitled to payment of 100% of his pre-disability income 
because his disabling conditions were job related; that he had provided sufficient 
evidence to support his claim for disability benefits and his benefits should be reinstated; 
and that Educators and Salt Lake City had no ability or right to offset Salt Lake City's 
disability benefit by the amount of Evans' VA benefit. 
On April 7, 2006, the trial court ruled that Evans' failure to provide his second 
appeal of Educators' denial of the 100% benefit for work related disability within the 
thirty-day time frame established by Educators precluded him from seeking that benefit 
but that there were issues of material fact as to whether the Plan was substantially similar 
to U.C.A. §49-21 et seq. which would allow Educators to offset Evans' Veterans 
disability benefits. The trial court also ruled that Evans had timely appealed the 
termination of his "any occupation" long term disability benefits beyond the initial two 
year, "own occupation" time period but that Educators had not responded to that appeal. 
Salt Lake City moved for summary judgment on the basis that Evans had not 
requested arbitration for his claims and that arbitration was required under the terms of 
the Plan. Evans argued that the decision by Salt Lake City, through its plan administrator 
and agent, Educators, to pursue Evans in litigation constituted a waiver of the right and 
obligation of the parties to arbitrate claims between them. On November 7,2006, the 
Court granted Salt Lake City summary judgment and held that the arbitration provisions 
in the Plan were enforceable against Evans. Despite this ruling, Educators maintained, 
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and continues to maintain, this action as Salt Lake City's plan administrator and agent in 
pursuing its claims against Evans in this lawsuit. 
After the April 7, 2006 decision from the court, Evans submitted additional 
medical records to Educators in support of his claim for long term disability benefits. 
Educators again denied that Evans was entitled to benefits. On May 21, 2007, the trial 
court ruled that Evans did not provide in a timely way the necessary medical evidence to 
support his claim for long term disability benefits for "any occupation" after the original 
two year "own occupation" disability period expired and he was therefore ineligible for 
benefits after the initial two year period. 
Thereafter, Evans and Educators filed cross motions for summary judgment on the 
only issue remaining in the case: whether Educators could offset against Evans' disability 
benefits from Salt Lake City the amount he was receiving in VA benefits. After an initial 
ruling in Evans' favor, on May 20, 2009, the trial court reversed course and ruled that 
Educators' offset of Evans' VA benefits was allowed under PELTDA. On June 19, 2009, 
Evans filed a timely notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties agree that the essential facts in the case are undisputed and that the 
trial court's Orders consisted of conclusions of law based on those undisputed facts. 
Those facts are: 
1. Salt Lake City has maintained a Plan to provide disability benefits for its public 
safety employees. Complaint ^|6, Answer ^|6, Record p. 91. 
2. Salt Lake City contracted with Educators, to be the administrator for the Plan. 
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Complaint f7, Answer f7, Record p. 94. 
3. The Plan states that its effective date of coverage was July 1,2001 and that, 
This Plan will automatically be renewed on its anniversary date 
for a period of one year unless otherwise terminated by The City. 
Record p. 1032. 
4. The Plan also states: 
Any provision of this Plan that, on the effective date, conflicts 
with any applicable statutes, is amended to conform to the 
minimum requirements of such statutes. 
Record 1045. The Plan in effect in 2002-2003 contains the same provisions. Record pp. 
91,105. 
5. Evans was a police officer for Salt Lake City for nearly 20 years. While serving 
as a police officer, he suffered a number of injuries and accidents in the line of duty 
that caused a variety of physical disabilities. Record p. 247-251, 253-256. 
6. Evans was called to military service and in 1991 had and incurred significant 
injuries during the Gulf War. The U.S. government determined that Evans was entitled 
to disability benefits through the Veterans Administration. Record p. 112,256,258-271, 
273. 
7. In October, 2001, after returning to his job as a police officer in the early 1990's, 
Evans became unable to continue working due to chronic pain, migraines, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, lumbar disc injury, fused C5-6, degenerative disc disease, head trauma, 
and knee and elbow surgeries. He applied for long term disability benefits through 
Educators. Record p. 253-256. 
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8. The Plan defines "disabled" as: 
[T]he complete inability due to medically determinable physical 
or mental impairment to engage in the employee's regular 
occupation during the waiting period and the first 24 months of 
disability. Thereafter, total disability means the complete 
inability, based solely on medically determinable physical 
impairment, to engage in any gainful occupation that 
is reasonable, considering the employee's education, training and 
experience.... 
Record p. 1043. 
9. In June, 2002, Dr. Stephen Wood, Evans' treating physician submitted an 
attending physician statement to Educators in which he outlined Evans' limitations and 
diagnosis. Record p. 243-245. 
10. On September 10, 2002, Educators awarded Evans long tern disability benefits for 
24 months, effective January 12, 2002, due to degenerative disc disease and chronic pain. 
The City paid Evans his full salary until June 6,2002, and Educators began paying 66 
2/3% of his pre-disability earnings as his long term disability benefit on June 7, 2002. 
Educators also withheld an estimated amount of Social Security Disability benefits to 
which it believed Evans might become entitled. Educators gave Evans 30 days to appeal 
its decision. Record p. 109-110. 
11. Throughout the time Mr. Evans was receiving long term disability benefits from 
Educators, he also was receiving his Veterans disability benefit. Record p. 
112,273,258-271. 
12. Educators did not initially reduce the amount of Evans' long term disability 
benefits by the amount of the Veterans disability benefit. Record p. 331. 
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13. The Plan provides under Basic Disability Benefits: 
The benefit is 100% of covered monthly salary for eligible employees 
whose disability occurs in the line of duty, reduced by any other 
income. The benefit is 66 2/3% of covered monthly salary for eligible 
employees whose disability occurs off duty, reduced by any other 
income . . . The waiting period is 12 consecutive weeks from the last 
day the covered employee was physically at work, or 12 consecutive 
weeks of paid short-tem disability (SDI). 
Record p. 1034. 
14. The Plan provides for "Benefits Adjustments and Offsets" if the covered employee 
is receiving benefits from certain other sources. 
Payments due under this policy will be reduced dollar for dollar 
by income received from any of the sources listed below during 
the period of time for which benefits are paid under this Plan . . . 
• • • 
-Armed Services retirement or disability programs. 
-Any payment from the United States Government, or state or 
local government agency or department thereof, as a result of 
the covered employee's employment. 
Record p. 1034. 
15. On October 3, 2002, Educators wrote to Evans and indicated it would begin 
withholding the amount of his Veterans disability benefits from his long term disability 
benefit. Record p. 112. 
16. Evans' attorney, Mark Bell (Bell) wrote to Educators on October 7,2002, 
requesting that it pay 100% benefit for Evans' long term disability benefits as allowed 
under the Plan because his disability was due to work related injuries. Bell also argued 
that Educators was not entitled to offset Evans' Veterans disability benefit and requested 
additional documents from Educators. Record p. 114-118. 
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17. On December 11, 2002, Educators' attorney wrote to Bell and upheld its decision 
that Evans was not entitled to a 100% benefit and that Educators was entitled to offset 
Evans Veterans disability benefits. Educators gave Evans' 60 days to appeal its decision. 
Record p. 120-121. 
18. On January 15, 2003, Educators wrote to Bell, requesting reimbursement of its 
alleged overpayment of long term disability benefits to Evans by the amount of Evans' 
monthly Veterans disability benefit. Record p. 227-228. 
19. On February 10, 2003, Bell wrote to Educators requesting a review of the decision 
outlined in Educators' December 11,2002, letter. Bell also requested a copy of an 
independent medical opinion referenced in the December 11,2002, letter. Record p. 125. 
20. On March 5, 2003, Educators wrote to Bell and maintained its position that Evans 
was entitled to payment of only 66 2/3% of his pay and that Educators was entitled to 
offset the amount of Evans' Veterans disability payments against the amount Educators 
was obligated to pay Evans. Educators ignored Bell's request for a copy of the 
independent medical opinion. Finally, Educators attached a copy of the Claims Review 
Process with its letter which stated Evans had 30 days to submit his appeal. Record p. 82. 
21. On May 2, 2003, Bell again wrote to Educators requesting an appeal of the 
previous issues raised. Bell's letter outlined several reasons that Educators' decision was 
wrong and referenced a copy of the independent medical opinion that Educators had 
relied on and that Bell had obtained some time after his receipt of Educators' March 5, 
2003, letter. Record p. 127-128. 
22. On May 8, 2003, Educators wrote to Bell and denied Evans' appeal as untimely. 
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Educators relied on the language of that Plan: 
If the Covered Person does not agree with the findings of the 
Claims Review Committee, in whole or in part, the Covered 
Person may request a review regarding the disputed claim and 
an in-person hearing by the Educators Board of Directors. This 
request must be in writing and must be received by 
Educators on behalf of the Plan Sponsor, within 30 days after the 
date of the letter indicating the decision of the Claims Review 
Committee. 
Record pp. 100-101; 130-131. 
23. On May 22,2003 and July 3,2002, Bell wrote to Educators requesting that it 
reconsider Evans' appeal. Record p. 133-135, 137-141. 
24. Educators refused to reconsider the appeal by indicating it "cannot change policy 
procedures" nor "waive the deadlines." Record p. 237, 239. 
25. On December 10,2003, Educators notified Evans that his payment of his long-
term disability benefits was denied, beginning January 11,2004, on the basis that, while 
he may have been disabled from his own occupation (and qualified for benefits for the 
initial 24 month disability period), he was not disabled from any occupation and did not 
qualify for benefits after January 11,2004. Record p. 143. 
26. On January 7,2004, Evans' successor counsel, Gary Atkin ("Atkin") wrote 
Educators and appealed Educator's determination that Evans was not disabled from any 
occupation. Record p. 147. 
27. On January 14, 2004, Educators wrote to Mr. Atkin indicating that it would review 
Evans' file in the next thirty days and requested any new medical information supporting 
Evans' claim for benefits. Record p. 149. 
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28. On February 10, 2004, Evans responded to Educators with an appeal letter 
indicating he remained disabled. Evans also referenced Educators' position that Bell had 
failed to appeal in a timely manner and requested Educators additional consideration of 
his claim. Record p. 241. 
29. Educators did not respond to Evans' appeal letter. 
30. Utah Code Ann. §49-21-201, a section in PELTDA, requires that: 
[e]ach participating employer shall cover its public safety 
employees under Title 49, Chapter 21, Public Safety Employees 
Long Term Disability Act, or a substantially similar long-term 
disability program. 
Utah Code Ann. §49-21-201 (2002) (emphasis added). 
31. Utah Code Ann. §49-21-201(6) states: 
(6) Public safety service employees, as defined in Sections 49-14-
102 and 49-15-102, who are covered under a long-term disability 
program offered by an employer which is substantially similar to 
this program are not eligible for coverage under this chapter (emphasis 
added). 
This provision of the PELTDA went into effect on July 1, 2002. 
32. The predecessor to U.C.A. §49-21, et. seq., Utah Code Ann. §49-9, et.seq., 
contained a similar provision which states: 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide long-term disability benefits 
for employees of employers participating in any system administered 
by the board except employees covered under the Firefighters' 
Retirement Act, or employees covered under the Public Safety 
Retirement Act who are covered under a long-term disability program 
offered by a political subdivision which is substantially equivalent to 
the program offered by the state under this chapter. 
33. Utah Code Ann. §49-9-402 (2001) provides in relevant part: 
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(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any 
amount received by, or due to, the employee from the following sources 
for the same period of time during which the employee is entitled to 
receive the monthly disability benefit: 
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by the employee, the 
employee's spouse, and the employee's dependent children, except that 
if Social Security benefits are increased to compensate for a change in 
the Consumer Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may 
not be further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits determined 
at the level in effect at the time of the commencement of benefits; 
(b) workers compensation; 
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs; 
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs; 
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan providing 
disability income benefits for which contributions or payroll 
deductions are made by the employer; 
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or disability 
program for which the employee is eligible; 
(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from 
a third party liable to the employee for the disability; and 
(h) unemployment compensation benefits 
(emphasis added). 
34. Renumbered and amended Utah Code Ann. §49-21 -402(2) (2002) provides that: 
the monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any amount 
received by, or payable to the eligible employee from the following 
sources • . . : 
a. Social Security disability benefits . . . ; 
b. Workers' compensation indemnity benefits; 
c. Any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement 
from a third party liable to the employee for the disability; 
d. Unemployment compensation benefits; 
e. Automobile no fault, medical payments or similar insurance 
benefits. 
f. Any other disability benefits resulting from the 
disability for which benefits are being received under this 
chapter 
(emphasis added). 
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35. The 2001-2002 Plan indicates that if, after the claims review process is exhausted: 
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN THE INSURED AND 
EDUCATORS IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO 
THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCATION, 
[sic] A COPY OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE FROM EDUCATORS. 
ALL PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION OF THE 
ARBITRATION COMMITTEE, WHICH IS FINAL. THE 
ARBITRATION AWARD MAY INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES IF 
ALLOWED BY STATE LAW AND MAY BE ENTERED AS A 
JUDGMENT IN ANY COURT OF PROPER JURISDICTION. 
Record p. 1041 (emphasis in original). 
36. In November, 2004, Educators filed a Complaint against Evans, seeking $8,510 
Educators alleged it had overpaid Evans for long term disability benefits. Complaint 
ffl[21,22,Recordp. 331. 
37. In January, 2005, Evans filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint 
seeking an order that Educators was not entitled to offset his VA benefit; for payment of 
long term disability benefits following January, 2004; and payment of long term 
disability benefits at 100% of his pay. Record p. 25-35. 
38. On January 13, 2005, Evans' treating physician, Dr. Stephen Wood, indicated that 
Evans was unable to work in any occupation based on degenerative disc disease, s/p C5-
6 fusion for radiculopathy, chronic neuropathic pain syndrome, post-Gulf War syndrome, 
interstitial lung disease, coronary artery disease, chronic fatigue syndrome, organic brain 
syndrome s/p head injury, chronic migraine headaches and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Record p. 281. 
39. In August, 2005, Educators submitted its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Evans submitted his Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in September, 2005. 
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Record p. 63-77,161-193. 
40. On April 7,2006, the Court held that Evans timely appealed Educators' decision 
to deny benefits after January, 2004, but that Educators had not responded. The Court 
also held that Evans failed to comply with the contractual requirements of the Plan to 
appeal within 30 days his claim that he was entitled to payment of 100% of his pre-
disability earnings for his disability benefits from January, 2002, to January, 2004, and 
that this barred him from recovery. Finally, the Court also held that questions of 
material fact remained as to whether the Plan was substantially similar to U.C.A. §49-21 
et seq., whether Educators was able to offset Evans' VA benefits under the Plan's 
language, whether Evans was injured in the line of duty and whether Evans was disabled 
from any and all occupations. Record p. 575-577. 
41. On March 22,2006, Educators wrote to Evans and indicated he had sixty days to 
appeal the denial of his claim for long term disability benefits after 
January, 2004. Educators indicated that Evans had not provided medical information 
supporting his disability in January, 2004 and had not undergone a vocational 
rehabilitation program. Record p. 706. 
42. On May 19, 2006, Evans' attorney submitted medical records dating from 2003 to 
2005, which supported his disability claim. The records included a statement that Evans' 
physician did not believe Evans was physically able to undergo or benefit from a 
vocational rehabilitation evaluation. Record p. 708-722. 
43. On August 23,2006, Educators wrote to Mr. King and indicated that the 
vocational rehabilitation evaluation was not relevant to the review of the case. Record p. 
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745. 
44. On August 28, 2006, Evans underwent an initial contact for a vocational 
rehabilitation evaluation. The vocational rehabilitation counselor concluded that Evans 
was unable to work in full or part-time employment and did not register him for an 
evaluation. Record p. 747. 
45. Educators ultimately denied Evans5 appeal, claiming he had not provided evidence 
to support his disability claim, failed to timely produce records to support his disability 
claim and that Evans did not participate in a mandatory vocational rehabilitation 
program. Record, p. 635-636, 724-732, 752-753. 
46. On January 17, 2006, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Evans. The City argued that Evans did not request arbitration as required by the Plan's 
terms. Record p. 490-514. 
47. Evans responded, in part, by arguing that the actions of Salt Lake City, through its 
plan administrator and agent, Educators, constituted a waiver of any arbitration process 
between the parties that might otherwise be required. Record pp. 519-541. 
48. On November 7,2006, the Court held that the Plan's arbitration provisions were 
enforceable and dismissed Evans' third party complaint against the City with prejudice. 
The trial court's order did not address Evans' argument that Salt Lake City had waived 
any right to arbitrate its dispute with Evans. Record p. 644-646. 
59. On November 6, 2008, Educators filed a Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Record p. 583-614. The trial court held that Evans had not provided 
supporting documentation in a timely manner in connection with his appeal to Educators. 
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The trial court also held that the issue of whether Educators is entitled to offset Evans' 
VA benefits was a remaining question of fact that could not be resolved by summary 
judgment. Record p. 795-796. 
50. On May 2, 2008, Evans filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Record p. 844-
873. Evans filed an accompanying affidavit indicating that he received a monthly 
Veterans disability benefit but did not receive an armed services retirement or disability 
benefit. Record p. 874-876. On May 2, 2008, Educators filed a Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Record p. 816-843. 
51. On September 18, 2008, the Court denied both parties' motions and held that the 
Act did not allow the City to offset Veterans disability benefits, that the Plan provisions 
that allowed Salt Lake City to offset Evans' disability benefits by the amount of his 
Veterans disability benefits conflicted with the PELTDA and, as such, Educators was not 
entitled to recover the $8,510 it sought in its Complaint. The Court also held that a 
question of material fact remained as to whether Evans had received long term disability 
benefits from the City for the same disabling conditions for which he was receiving 
Veterans disability benefits. Record p. 926-928. 
52. On October 3, 2008, Educators filed a Motion for Relief from Order and Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Record, p. 930-941. 
53. On January 27, 2009, the trial court granted Educators' Motion and held that 
Evans' reliance on the 2002 statute was incorrect. The trial court struck its September 
18,2008, Order and held that Educators was entitled to offset Evans' Veterans disability 
benefits according to U.C.A. §49-9-402 (2001). The trial court further held that if Evans 
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was receiving Veterans disability benefits for the same disabling conditions for which he 
was receiving benefits under the Plan, Educators was entitled to offset that amount. The 
trial court ordered Evans to provide to Educators any information of a separate disability, 
if such exists. Record p. 1060-1064. 
54. On May 20,2009, the trial court struck its January 27, 2009, ruling and issued an 
Amended Ruling. The trial court held that Educators was entitled to offset Evans' 
Veterans disability benefits according to U.C.A. §49-9-402 (2001) and that the intent of 
the 2001 and 2002 versions of the statute were consistent. Record p. 1072-1076. The 
Court also found that neither the Plan nor the PELTDA required that, in order to offset 
benefits, the disabilities for which the covered person was receiving disability benefits 
from an "armed services retirement or disability program" be the same disabilities for 
which the covered person was receiving disability benefits under the Plan or the 
PELTDA. Both parties submitted their proposed orders and the Court entered Educators' 
Proposed Order as the correct interpretation of the Court's ruling. Record p. 1068-1070. 
55. On June 19, 2009, Evans filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 
56. On August 7, 2009, the Court entered a final judgment against Evans in the 
amount of $8,510.78, plus $3,828.38 in pre-judgment interest, and 2.37%per annum in 
post-judgment interest from May 20, 2009 through the date the judgment is satisfied i. 
Record p. 1107-1109. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both the terms of the Plan and PELTDA require Salt Lake City and Educators to 
provide benefits that are, at the very least, substantially similar to the PELTDA. The trial 
20 
court erred in allowing Educators to offset Evans's disability benefits by the amount he 
was receiving for Veterans disability benefits because those federal benefits were for 
different disabilities arising out of a different period of time for service provided to a 
different employer. In addition, "armed services retirement or disability programs" as 
referenced in the 2001 version of the PELTDA, are not the same as Veterans disability 
benefits. Offsetting Evans' benefits under the Plan by his Veterans disability payments 
did not provide Evans with "substantially similar" benefits as were, and are, provided 
under the PELTDA. 
The trial court's decision that Educators may strictly enforce its thirty day second 
appeal time limit regarding whether Evans was disabled due to job related injuries was 
also error. Educators' imposition of multiple, varying times for appeal of claims is not 
substantially similar to the terms of the PELTDA. Educators' refusal to waive Bell's 
relatively minor delinquency in submitting an appeal for Evans was arbitrary and 
capricious and an abuse of any discretion Educators or Salt Lake City had to administer 
the Plan. This is especially true in light of Educators' failure to provide documents 
requested by Evans' counsel in a timely way and to respond at all to Evans' February 10, 
2004 appeal. 
The lower court's ruling that Evans is obligated to arbitrate his claims against Salt 
Lake City was erroneous in light of the consistent action Educators, as plan administrator 
and agent for Salt Lake City, has taken in aggressively pursuing litigation rather than 
arbitration. Salt Lake City cannot subject Evans to the expense and inconvenience of 
defending against its actions in litigation while insisting that Evans' claims for wrongly 
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denied disability benefits must be arbitrated. The actions of Salt Lake City and its plan 
administrator and agent, Educators, in litigating this case constitute a waiver of any right 
Salt Lake City has to insist that Evans arbitrate his claims. 
Finally, having ruled that Evans timely appealed Educators' denial of his right to 
payment of "any occupation" disability benefits after January, 2004, the trial court erred 
in ruling that Educators did not have any obligation to consider the evidence Evans 
submitted in 2006, after the trial court's ruling resurrected his appeal on that issue. The 
second ruling effectively nullified, for no good reason, the trial court's initial ruling that 
Evans had submitted a timely appeal of the denial in the first place. 
In light of the trial court's multiple errors in the handling of the case, this Court 
should reverse the trial court on all issues raised in this appeal and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with the arguments presented by Evans. 
ARGUMENT 
L IN OFFSETTING EVANS9 VETERANS DISABILITY BENEFITS 
AGAINST HIS LONG TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS, EDUCATORS 
VIOLATED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PELTDA. 
Salt Lake City established its Group Long Term Disability Plan, with Educators as 
the plan administrator, in order to provide long term disability benefits to its employees. 
The Plan went into effect for Salt Lake employees on July 1, 2001. The State and its 
subdivisions, including Salt Lake City, were required to provide disability benefits to all 
public employees under the 2001 version of PELTDA, U.C.A. §49-9-101 et seq. Under 
U.C.A §49-9-402(2), Educators was allowed to offset from disability payments various 
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other specifically identified payment sources for the employee1. 
In 2002, the Utah Legislature amended and renumbered PELTDA and modified 
the language of the section of the act dealing with offsets based on income from other 
sources. Section 49-21-402(2)2 removed language allowing offset of disability benefits 
from any "armed services retirement or disability programs" and included subsection (f) 
to offset for "any other disability benefits resulting from the disability for which benefits 
are being received under this chapter." U.C.A. §49-21 et seq., became effective July 1, 
2002. 
1
 U.C.A. §49-9-402(2) provides in relevant part: 
(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or due to, the employee 
from the following sources for the same period of time during which the employee is entitled to receive the 
monthly disability benefit: 
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by the employee, the employee's spouse, and the 
employee's dependent children, except that if Social Security benefits are increased to compensate 
for a change in the Consumer Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may not be 
further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits determined at the level in effect at the time of 
the commencement of benefits; 
(b) workers' compensation; 
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs; 
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs; 
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan providing disability income benefits for which 
contributions or payroll deductions are made by the employer; 
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or disability program for which the employee is 
eligible; 
(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action or settlement from a third party liable to the 
employee for the disability; and 
(h) unemployment compensation benefits. 
2
 U.C.A. §49-21-402(2) provides in relevant part: 
(2) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or payable to, the eligible employee 
from the following sources for the same period of time during which the eligible employee is entitled to receive a 
monthly disability benefit; 
(a) Social Security disability benefits, including all benefits received by the eligible employee, the 
eligible employee's spouse, and the eligible employee's dependent children; 
(b) Workers' compensation indemnity benefits; 
(c) Any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a third party liable to the 
employee for the disability; 
(d) Unemployment compensation benefits; 
(e) Automobile no-fault, medical payments, or similar insurance payments; and 
(f) Any other disability benefits resulting from the disability for which benefits are being received 
under this chapter. 
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PELTDA contains an exception to the general requirement for the State to provide 
long term disability benefits to all public employees: 
Public safety service employees, as defined by Sections 49-14-102 and 49- 15-
102, who are covered under the long term disability program offered by an employer 
which is substantially similar to this program are not eligible for coverage under this 
chapter. 
U.C.A. §49-21-201(6) (emphasis added). Evans, a Salt Lake City police officer, was 
considered a public safety service employee. See U.C.A. §49-14-102(5) and (6). 
Salt Lake City opted to establish its own self-funded disability program. 
However, the terms of the Plan and the manner in which it was administered, at least as 
to Evans' claims, were not substantially similar to PELTDA. The Plan allowed Salt Lake 
City to offset its long term disability benefits by the amount of benefits the disabled 
employee received from "armed services retirement or disability programs." That offset 
was specifically prohibited under U.C.A. §49-21-402(2) effective July 1, 2002. But even 
under the terms of the 2001 version of the PELTDA, which the trial court ruled was the 
version of the statute that applies to this case, Educators actions in offsetting Evans' 
Veterans disability benefits against his PELTDA benefit was improper. 
The trial court erred in ruling that Evans' Veterans disability benefits were "armed 
services disability benefits" within the meaning of U.C.A. §49-9-402 (2001) and could be 
offset by Educators and the Plan. Record p. 927,1072-1076. Evans did not receive 
armed services disability benefits which Educators could offset under the 2001 statute 
during the time he was receiving long term disability benefits from Educators. Rather, he 
received Veterans disability benefits. Armed services disability benefits are not the same 
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as Veterans disability benefits. Record, p. 27. Evans stated in his Affidavit that he never 
received armed services benefits but, rather, he had been awarded Veterans disability 
benefits. Record p. 874-876 
The armed services disability benefit is for military disability separation and 
retirement. The definitions and limitations are set forth in 10 U.S.C. §§1201-1222. The 
U.S. Code allows the military department to retire or separate members when the 
individual is unfit to perform military duties because of physical disability. A Medical 
Evaluation Board reviews the individual and recommends either return to duty, 
temporary disability, separating the individual from active duty or medically retiring the 
member. The military rates compensate for loss of a military career as a severance pay. 
Id. Armed Services disability benefits are determined for individuals while they are 
actively serving rather than after their discharge from the military. 10 U.S.C. § 1203(a). 
See also Department of Defense Instruction Number 1332.18 for more information about 
military service benefits. 
Veterans disability benefits, on the other hand, are set forth in 38 U.S.C. §1110, 
and are governed by the Department of Veteran Affairs. This benefit compensates 
individuals after their discharge from military service and is calculated based on years of 
service and type(s) of injury(ies) incurred during that service. Id. While it may be true 
that Veterans disability benefits are provided to service members for injuries incurred 
during active duty, they are not the only type of compensation for active duty injuries. 
The United States Court of Claims and its successor, the United States Court of Federal 
Claims, have both distinguished between Veterans disability benefits and Armed Services 
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disability benefits. Hinkle v. U.S.. 229 CtCl. 801, 804-05 (1982) (Veterans disability 
benefit awards are distinct from, and determined differently than, active service disability 
retirement awards); Lockwood v. U.S.. 90 Fed. CI. 210, 219 (2008) ("although a VA 
rating decision may be relevant to consideration of an appropriate disability rating, it is 
not binding on the service branch"). 
Educators also argued that while the Department of Defense may discharge 
soldiers based upon disability, payments for those disabilities are made by Veterans 
Affairs. This argument creates the illusion that all military disability benefits are to be 
considered Veterans disability benefits, which is incorrect. 
While both the military and the Veterans Administration use the Veterans 
Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities ("VASRD"), the two entities utilize 
different objectives and criteria in evaluating and awarding benefits. In Jane Doe v. U.S., 
2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 160, *45-46 (2009), the court found that the military uses the 
VASRD "to determine fitness for performing the duties of office, grade and rank, 
whereas the VA uses the VASRD to determine disability ratings based on an evaluation 
of the individual's capacity to function and perform tasks in the civilian world" (citing 
Haskins v. U.S.. 51 Fed.Cl. 818, 826 (2002)). 
Evans received his Veterans disability benefit due to posttraumatic stress disorder, 
fatigue, memory loss, joint aches and muscle aches with fasciculations, sleep disorder 
and occasional vertigo, a skin condition and migraines. It was not awarded until after he 
was honorably discharged from the Army. The Department of Veterans Affairs, rather 
than a branch of the military service, issued a disability rating for his conditions and pays 
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Evans' Veterans disability benefit. 
In any event, even if Educators is correct in asserting that until July 1,2002, the 
earlier version of the PELTDA applies to this case, after that date, the Plan language 
itself makes clear that the provisions of the Plan will be amended to reflect changes in the 
PELTDA. The 2001-2002 Plan indicates that: 
This Plan will automatically be renewed on its anniversary date for a period 
of one year, unless otherwise terminated by The City. 
Record, p. 1032. The same provision exists in the 2002-2003 version of the Plan. 
Record, p. 91. 
In addition, for both the 2001-2002 and the 2002-2003 Plan years, the Plan states: 
Any provision of this Plan that, on the effective date, conflicts with any 
applicable statutes, is amended to conform to the minimum requirements of 
such statutes. 
Record at 1045 (for the 2001-2002 Plan) and 105 (for the 2002-2003 Plan). 
To the extent there is any conflict between the terms of the PELTDA in place in 
2001 and that became effective on July 1, 2002, the rights a disabled individual had under 
the Plan were modified to reflect changes in the statute. Evans contends that under both 
versions of the PELTDA it was impermissible for Educators to offset his disability 
benefits from Salt Lake City by what he received in Veterans disability benefits. But 
even if Salt Lake City and Educators had the ability to offset those benefits based on the 
"armed services retirement or disability program" language in the 2001 PELTDA, that 
ability vanished as of July 1,2002 when the new version of the PELTDA, with its more 
straightforward language prohibiting the Veterans disability benefit from offset, came 
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into effect. 
Interestingly, the trial court's Amended Ruling of May 20, 2009, stated that the 
Utah State Legislature's goal in amending the 2001 statute was not to modify the 
benefits, but rather to clarify the language. Record p. 1075. Evans disagrees. When the 
Legislature deleted the phrase "armed services retirement or disability programs," and 
inserted the language found in subsection (f), it was doing more than clarifying the 
statute. But to the extent the trial court's conclusion that the 2002 revision to the statute 
was a clarifying rather than a substantive change, it supports Evans' argument that the 
PELTDA never intended to allow Salt Lake City and Educators to offset Evans' long 
term disability benefit by the Veterans disability benefits he was receiving. This is true 
because U.C.A. §49-21-402(2) does not identify Veterans disability benefits as an offset 
source and more clearly states that Educators and Salt Lake City may not offset payments 
being made for a separate type of disability or from a different time frame or employment 
period. U.C.A. §49-21-402(2)(f). 
There is no question that to allow Educators to offset Evans' Veterans disability 
benefits fails to provide him benefits under the Plan that are substantially similar to what 
Evans is entitled to under the PELTDA. Educators' application of the offset for Evans' 
Veterans disability benefit reduced his long term disability benefit by close to $2,500 a 
month for the initial 24-month period Educators paid him benefits. Record p. 331. 
Educators' offset reduced Evans' benefit by over 95%. His monthly long term disability 
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benefit payment under the Plan decreased from $2,553.90 to $113.904. The significant 
disparity between the benefit Evans received under the Plan versus the benefits he would 
have received under the Act make it obvious there is no substantial similarity between the 
two. 
In addition, Evans' medical records make it clear that the injuries and disabilities 
for which Evans was awarded Veterans disability benefits from his Gulf War service 
were very different than the injuries and disabilities he sustained in the line of duty as a 
police officer for Salt Lake City. Evans' Veterans disability benefits were based on 
posttraumatic stress disorder, fatigue, memory loss, joint aches, muscle aches with 
fasciculations, sleep disorder, migraine headaches and occasional vertigo. Record p. 258-
271. His long term disability benefits under the Plan were based on degenerative disc 
disease and chronic pain from his work-related injuries. 
When Evans was discharged from military service, he returned to Salt Lake and 
completed almost twenty years of service as a police officer. The conditions involved in 
his Veterans disability benefits did not prevent him from working as a police officer. 
However, over his years of service with Salt Lake City, Evans incurred several injuries in 
the performance of his duty as a police officer. Those injuries were the major cause of 
his inability to continue working in 2001. 
Even Educators agrees that Evans' Veterans disability benefits are for completely 
4
 Educators also improperly offset Evans long term disability benefits with its estimate of Social Security disability 
income of $1,000 a month from June, 2002 to December, 2002. However, Evans lacks sufficient income credits in 
the social security program to qualify for Social Security disability income. Educators has never refunded Evans the 
amount it wrongfully withheld but rather improperly applied it to the alleged overpayment amount at issue in the 
case 
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different conditions than those that disabled Evans in 2001. In November, 2002, 
Educators faxed to Evans' treating physician, Dr. Stephen Wood, a letter stating that 
Educators would not consider Evans' Gulf War disabilities in its evaluation of his request 
for disability benefits under the Plan. Subsequently Educators determined that Evans was 
disabled due to degenerative disc disease and chronic pain. Record p. 275. 
It is improper for Educators to refuse to consider Evans' Gulf War disabling 
conditions when determining his eligibility for long term disability benefits under the 
Plan, and, for the same time frame, use the Veterans disability benefits as a basis to offset 
payment of Evans long term disability benefits. U.C.A §49-21 -402(2)(f) of the Act 
allows only for offsets for uany other disability resulting from the disability for which 
benefits are being received under this chapter" (emphasis added). 
The amount of money Evans is left with if the trial court ruling is allowed to stand 
is a pittance compared to the amount he would be paid under the PELTDA without 
allowing for an offset of his Veterans disability benefits. Educators and Salt Lake City 
may not make up rules for payment of benefits to their own economic benefit, and Evans' 
detriment, that so clearly run afoul of the PELTDA. 
II. EDUCATORS5 THIRTY DAY ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL DEADLINE DOES NOT PREVENT 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EVANS' CLAIM 
The trial court upheld Educators' application of its thirty-day administrative 
appeal deadline on the issue of whether his disabling conditions were a result of injuries 
sustained on the job. Educators argued, and the trial court agreed, that Evans failed to 
exhaust his administrative appeals and, consequently, the trial court had no ability to 
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review Evans' claim. However, Educators' refusal to excuse the failure of Evans' 
attorney to file his second level administrative appeal within the strict time frames 
unilaterally established by Educators was arbitrary and capricious. In any event, 
Educators' appeal deadlines were unreasonable and were not substantially similar to the 
rights and obligations outlined under PELTDA. 
Educators' Plan is not substantially similar to PELTDA on the point of deadlines 
for submitting administrative appeals. The statute does not contain any type of thirty-day 
appeal limitation which employees are required to follow. The only time limit found in 
U.C.A. §49-21-401(9) states: 
A claim brought by an eligible employee for long term disability benefits under 
the Public Employee's Long-Term Disability Program is barred if it is not 
commenced within one year from the eligible employee's date of disability, 
unless the office determines that under the surrounding facts and circumstances, 
the eligible employee's failure to comply with the time limitations was reasonable. 
(emphasis added). Importantly, PELTDA does allow exceptions to its one-year time 
limit based on the reasonableness of an employee's efforts to file a claim in a timely 
manner. It is undisputed that Evans filed his disability claim within one year after the 
commencement of his disability. Evans complied with the only time limit found in the 
Act and should not be held to the arbitrary thirty-day deadline found in the Plan and 
strictly enforced by Educators. 
Educators' strict enforcement of the Plan's appeal deadlines is especially improper 
in light of the fact that Educators set up multiple, mandatory administrative appeals when 
an applicant's claims were denied. The initial appeal time frame outlined in the Plan is 
60 days. However, the deadline for appeal of the second level denial is 30 days. There is 
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no justification for the existence, let alone strict enforcement, of these multiple, varying 
time frames. Educators has used them as tripwires for the unwary claimant or their 
attorney. Especially when viewed in light of the absence of any similar time limited 
framework found in PELTDA, the trial court's rulings upholding Educators' actions must 
be reversed. 
Even if the Court finds that the differences between PELTDA and the Plan as to 
the appeal time requirements are not substantially dissimilar, Educators' refusal to waive 
the 30-day time limit or make an exception in this case was unreasonable. According to 
the Plan, if a claimant does not successfully appeal in thirty days, he is unable to exhaust 
the administrative appeal and pursue legal action. Evans' former attorney submitted an 
appeal letter 58 days after the date of Educator's second level denial letter. Evans' 
attorney immediately requested that Educators waive his relatively minor tardiness but 
Educators refused to do so. Although the Plan required the second level appeal to be 
submitted within thirty days, Evans' attorney's late appeal did not result in any prejudice 
to Educators, Salt Lake City or the Plan. Utah's notice prejudice rule found at U.C.A. 
31A-21-312(2) provides a suitable analogy to these circumstances and demonstrates that 
Educators should not be allowed to bar Evans' access to judicial review of his denial of 
benefits based on a technical failure to comply with Educators' artificially short time 
frames for appealing denied claims under the Plan. 
Further, it was unreasonable for Educators to strictly enforce its thirty day appeal 
time limit when Educators did not respond in a timely way to Evans own appeals and 
requests for documents. For example, it took Educators over two months to respond to 
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Mr. Bell's October 7, 2002, letter. In addition, Educators did not respond in a timely way 
to Evans' attorney's request for a copy of the independent medical opinion Educators 
relied on in making its determination that Evans was not eligibility for disability benefits. 
III. THE PLAN'S ARBITRATION PROVISION 
IS UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
The trial court's ruling that Salt Lake City is entitled to enforce the Plan's 
arbitration provision must be reversed. Salt Lake City's consistent choice to pursue 
litigation against Evans to enforce its putative rights under the Plan is completely 
inconsistent with its argument that Evans is required to arbitrate his right to disability 
benefits against the Plan. 
Acting as the agent for Salt Lake City and as the administrator of the Plan, 
Educators initiated this action by filing a Complaint on November 18, 2004 against Evans 
alleging Breach of Contract and Quantum Meruit/\Jn)ust Enrichment as causes of action. 
On January 3, 2005, Evans filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint 
against Educators and Salt Lake City. The City filed an Answer on March 4, 2005. 
Almost a year later, Salt Lake City filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against Evans 
based on the arbitration provision in the Plan. However, Salt Lake City has never taken 
any action to rein in Educators, its agent and the Plan administrator, from aggressively 
pursuing litigation against Evans in this case. Even after the trial court granted Salt Lake 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment, Educators, acting on behalf of Salt Lake City and 
the Plan, pursued their claims relentlessly. These actions by Salt Lake City and 
Educators constitute a waiver of any right they may have had to compel arbitration by 
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Evans of his claims under the Plan. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two-step test to evaluate whether a 
waiver of an arbitration clause has occurred. First is whether " . . . the party seeking 
arbitration substantially participated in the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent 
with the intent to arbitrate/' and second, "that this participation resulted in prejudice to 
the opposing party." Cedar Surgery Center v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58, [^14 (Utah 2004); 
Chandler v. BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992). 
As to the first question, Salt Lake City participated in litigation that was 
inconsistent with any intent to arbitrate. It directed Educators to sue Evans to recover 
amounts it claims were owed from Evans under the Plan. It answered Evans' Third Party 
Complaint and did not raise its argument about requiring arbitration until over a year after 
its agent, Educators, began litigation against Evans. It is striking that, despite obtaining 
an order from the trial court that arbitration is the proper forum for this dispute, Salt Lake 
City has made no attempt whatsoever to call its dog, Educators, off of pursuing Evans. 
As for the second prong, the City's participation in the lawsuit prejudiced Evans. 
Evans has incurred legal expenses in litigation that could have been avoided had the City 
immediately requested arbitration. Evans and Educators, acting as the agent of Salt Lake 
City, have exchanged numerous motions and pleadings in the case over the course of 
several years and Evans has incurred substantial attorney fees and costs in connection 
with this litigation. Salt Lake City finds it advantageous to require Evans to fend off 
Educators' overpayment claims under the Plan in Third District Court while at the same 
time denying that it has to answer to Evans' claims that Salt Lake City and Educators 
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owe him money under the same Plan anywhere but in arbitration. This is purely to Salt 
Lake City's benefit and to the detriment of Evans' resources. It is an abuse of the 
procedural process outlined under the Plan and contemplated by PELTDA. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE EDUCATORS 
TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE EVANS PRESENTED IN 2006 RELATING 
TO PROOF OF EVANS DISABILTY FROM ANY OCCUPATION. 
The trial court erred in upholding Educators denial of Evans' eligibility for long 
term disability benefits beyond January, 2004. In December, 2003, Educators wrote to 
Evans and told him it was terminating his benefits on January 11,2004, because Evans 
had not demonstrated he was disabled from any occupation as required by the Plan. 
Evans' right to disability benefits after January 11, 2004, required him to prove that he 
was disabled from "any gainful occupation that is reasonable, considering the employee's 
education, training and experience." On January 7, 2004, Evans' counsel wrote to 
Educators and appealed that denial. On February 10,2004, Evans also wrote to 
Educators requesting a review of the denial of his claim for "any occupation" long term 
disability benefits. Despite Evans' request, Educators did not respond. It was not until 
over two years later, after the trial court ruled that this correspondence from Evans and 
his attorney constituted a valid appeal of Evans' right to disability benefits after the initial 
two year period, that Educators finally responded to Evans' request for review. 
In response to the trial court's ruling, Educators sent a March 22, 2006 letter 
denying Evans' appeal on the basis that Evans failed to provide Educators with any 
information supporting his claim for disability benefits within thirty days after Educators 
requested that information and that Evans had failed to undergo a vocational 
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rehabilitation program during the time he was receiving disability benefits. Educators 
gave Evans sixty days to appeal its denial of his "own occupation" disability benefits. 
Educators' justifications for its denial were weak at best. It already had evidence 
that Evans was disabled from any occupation. This included a 2002 Attending Physician 
Statement from Dr. Wood outlining Evans' physical condition. Record p. 243-245. In 
any event, Evans produced additional information and medical records proving that he 
was disabled from any occupation. Record pp. 708-722. In addition, Evans underwent 
an initial interview in connection with a vocational rehabilitation evaluation and it was 
determined that he was unable to work in any occupation. Record, p. 747 
In spite of its earlier concern that Evans was not entitled to continuing disability 
benefits because he had not undergone a vocational rehabilitation evaluation, Educators 
declared that the initial vocational interview which determined that Evans was disabled 
was not relevant and that the supporting "contractually mandated records" were produced 
too late in the process. Record, p. 724-725. 
Rather than allow Evans an opportunity to prove his claim for entitlement to "own 
occupation" disability benefits on the merits, Educators moved for Summary Judgment 
on this issue based on its allegation that Evans had failed to comply with the same short 
time frames for internal appeals that it had previously used to deny Evans' appeals 
concerning his Veterans disability benefits. And, again, the trial court upheld Educators' 
denial based on the same application of those short time frames. 
The trial court's ruling is especially problematic in light of the fact that it had 
earlier ruled that the Evans did timely appeal Educators decision as of January 11, 2004, 
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to deny his "own occupation" benefits. Record, pp. 575-577. The trial court's 
subsequent ruling upholding Educators' denial of Evans' appeal based on the argument 
that Evans had not timely produced his medical records, Record, pp. 795-796, had the 
effect of eviscerating the earlier Order. 
The trial court failed to take into account the inherent collaborative nature of an 
appeal process and the need to give a claimant such as Evans a full and fair opportunity 
to submit a meaningful appeal. In other contexts involving administrative appeal of 
denied disability benefit claims, a full and fair review requires, "knowing what evidence 
the decision-maker relied upon, having an opportunity to address the accuracy and 
reliability of the evidence and having the decision-maker consider the evidence presented 
by both parties prior to reaching and rendering his decision." See Sage v. Automation, 
Inc. Pension Plan & Trust 845 F.2d 885, 893-94(10th Cir. 1988) (discussing ERISA's 
pre-litigation review process). Educators did not conduct a full and fair review of Evans' 
claim, nor did it fairly consider all of Evans' evidence before it issued its denial. It cut 
Evans off at the pass by asking the trial court to rule on its denial of Evans benefits, not 
by looking at the evidence Evans submitted, but by simply ruling that Evans had not 
acted in a timely manner in submitting that evidence. The trial court erred in refusing to 
review Evans' claim on its merits. 
It is not as if Evans submitted no medical evidence of his right to receive benefits 
after the initial 24-month period due to being disabled from any occupation. Evans 
submitted substantial medical records documenting his continuing degenerative disc 
disease, s/p C5-6 fusion for radiculopathy, chronic neuropathic pain syndrome, post Gulf 
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War syndrome, interstitial lung disease, coronary artery disease, chronic fatigue 
syndrome, organic brain syndrome s/p head injury, chronic migraine headaches and post-
traumatic stress disorder. Evans' treating physician, Dr. Wood, supported the long-term 
disability claim by indicating that Evans was unable to work in any occupation. Record 
p. 281. 
This Court should reverse the trial court ruling that Evans did not timely submit 
this information and should remand the case for consideration of Evans claims of 
disability beyond the initial 24 month period on their merits. 
Respectfully submitted this ^_ day of March, 2010. 
Brian S. King / 
Attorney for Appellant (loel Evans 
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TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES 
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW 
PART II. PERSONNEL 
CHAPTER 61. RETIREMENT OR SEPARATION FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY 
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory 
10 USCS §1203 
§ 1203. Regulars and members on active duty for more than 30 days: separation 
(a) Separation. Upon a determination by the Secretary concerned that a member described in section 1201(c) of this 
title [10 USCS § 1201(c)] is unfit to perform the duties of the member's office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical 
disability incurred while entitled to basic pay or while absent as described in section 1201(c)(3) of this title [10 USCS § 
1201(c)(3)], the member may be separated from the member's armed force, with severance pay computed under section 
1212 of this title [10 USCS § 1212], if the Secretary also makes the determinations with respect to the member and that 
disability specified in subsection (b). 
(b) Required determinations of disability. Determinations referred to in subsection (a) are determinations by the 
Secretary that— 
(1) the member has less than 20 years of service computed under section 1208 of this title [10 USCS § 1208]; 
(2) the disability is not the result of the member's intentional misconduct or willful neglect, and was not incurred 
during a period of unauthorized absence; 
(3) based upon accepted medical principles, the disability is or may be of a permanent nature; and 
(4) either--
(A) the disability is less than 30 percent under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs at the time of the determination, and the disability was (i) the proximate result of performing active 
duty, (ii) incurred in line of duty in time of war or national emergency, or (iii) incurred in line of duty after September 
14,1978; 
(B) the disability is less than 30 percent under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs at the time of the determination, the disability was not noted at the time of the member's entrance on 
active duty (unless clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the disability existed before the member's 
entrance on active duty and was not aggravated by active military service); or 
(C) the disability is at least 30 percent under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the Department of 
Veterans Affairs at the time of the determination, the disability was neither (i) the proximate result of performing active 
10 USCS § 1203 
Page 2 
duty, (ii) incurred in line of duty in time of war or national emergency, nor (iii) incurred in line of duty after September 
14, 1978, and the member has less than eight years of service computed under section 1208 of this title [10 USCS § 
1208] on the date when he would otherwise be retired under section 1201 of this title [10 USCS § 1201] or placed on 
the temporary disability retired list under section 1202 of this title [10 USCS § 1202]. 
However, if the member is eligible for transfer to the inactive status list under section 1209 of this title, and so elects, he 
shall be transferred to that list instead of being separated. 
HISTORY: 
(Aug. 10,1956, ch 1041, § 1, 70A Stat. 92; Sept. 2,1958, P.L. 85-861, § 1(28)(A), 72 Stat. 1451; Sept. 7,1962, P.L. 
87-651, Title I, § 107(a), 76 Stat. 508; Sept. 19,1978, P.L. 95-377, § 3(2), (3), 92 Stat. 719; Sept. 8, 1980, P.L. 96-343, 
§ 10(c)(2), (3), 94 Stat. 1129; Dec. 12, 1980, P.L. 96-513, Title I, § 117, 94 Stat. 2878; Nov. 29, 1989, P.L. 101-189, 
Div A, Title XVI, Part C, § 1621(a)(1), 103 Stat. 1602; Oct. 5,1994, P.L. 103-337, Div A, Title XVI, Subtitle C, § 
1671(c)(6), 108 Stat. 3014; Sept. 23, 1996, P.L. 104-201, Div A, Title V, Subtitle H, § 572(c), 110 Stat. 2533.) 
(As amended Jan. 28,2008, P.L. 110-181, Div A, Title XVI, Subtitle D, § 1641(b), 122 Stat. 465; Oct. 14,2008, P.L. 
110-417, [Div A,] Title VII, Subtitle C, § 727(b), 122 Stat. 4510.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Prior law and revision: 
1956 Act 
Revised Section Source (USCS) Source (Statutes at Large) 
1203 37:272(a) (2d Oct. 12, 1949, ch. 681, 
proviso). Sec. 402(a) (2d proviso), 
37:272(b) (2d and last (b)(2d and last provi-
provisos). sos), 63 Stat. 816, 817. 
To state fully in the revised section the rule contained in 37:272(a)(2d proviso) and 272(b) (2d and last provisos), the 
provisions of 37:272(a) (less clause (5), and less 1st proviso), 272(b) (less clause (5), and less 1st proviso) and 272(f) 
(less applicability to 37:272(c) and (e)), also contained in section 1201 of this title, are repeated. The words "the 
member may be separated" are substituted for the words "the member concerned shall not be eligible for any disability 
retirement provided in this section, but may be separated for physical disability," in 37:272(a) (2d proviso) and 
37:272(b) (2d proviso). 
Clause (1) is inserted for clarity, since a member who had over 20 years of service would qualify under section 1201 
or 1202 of this title. 
Clause (4)(A) is substituted for 37:272(a) (1st 20 words of 2d proviso). 
Clause (4)(B) is substituted for 37:272(b) (1st 20 words of 2d proviso). 
Clause (4)(C) is substituted for 37:272(b) (last proviso). 
The last sentence of the revised section, relating to transfer to the inactive status list, is inserted for clarity because of 
section 1209 of this title. 
1958 Act 
Revised Section Source (USCS) Source (Statutes at Large) 
Page 1 
I LexisNexis® 
15 of 35 DOCUMENTS 
UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE 
Copyright © 2010 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
a member of the LexisNexis Group (TM) 
All rights reserved. 
*** CURRENT THROUGH PL 111-145, APPROVED 3/4/2010 *** 
TITLE 38. VETERANS* BENEFITS 
PART II. GENERAL BENEFITS 
CHAPTER 11. COMPENSATION FOR SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY OR DEATH 
SUBCHAPTER II. WARTIME DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory 
38 USCS §1110 
§ 1110. Basic entitlement 
For disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a 
preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military, naval, or air service, during a 
period of war, the United States will pay to any veteran thus disabled and who was discharged or released under 
conditions other than dishonorable from the period of service in which said injury or disease was incurred, or 
preexisting injury or disease was aggravated, compensation as provided in this subchapter [38 USCS §§ 1110 et seq.], 
but no compensation shall be paid if the disability is a result of the veteran's own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol 
or drugs. 
HISTORY: 
(Sept. 2,1958, P.L. 85-857, § 1,72 Stat. 1119; Nov. 5,1990, P.L. 101-508, Title VIII, Subtitle F, § 8052(a)(2), 104 
Stat. 1388-351; Aug. 6,1991, P.L. 102-83, § 5(a), 105 Stat. 406.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Prior law and revision: 
This section is based on 38 USC§2310 (Act June 17,1957, P.L. 85-56, Title III, Part B, § 310, 71 Stat. 96). 
This section is also based on the following provisions, which were repealed by Act June 17,1957, P.L. 85-56, Title 
XXII, §2202, 71 Stat. 162: 
Veterans' Regulation No. 1(a), Part I, para. 1(a) (as amended Acts July 13,1943, ch 233, § 9(a), 57 Stat. 556; Aug. 4, 
1955, ch 561, §1,69 Stat. 497). 
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TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 21. INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
PART 3. SPECIFIC CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-312 (2009) 
§ 31A-21-312. Notice and proof of loss 
(1) Every insurance policy shall provide that: 
(a) when notice of loss is required separately from proof of loss, notice given by or on behalf of the insured to any 
authorized agent of the insurer within this state, with particulars sufficient to identify the policy, is notice to the insurer; 
and 
(b) failure to give any notice or file any proof of loss required by the policy within the time specified in the policy 
does not invalidate a claim made by the insured, if the insured shows that it was not reasonably possible to give the 
notice or file the proof of loss within the prescribed time and that notice was given or proof of loss filed as soon as 
reasonably possible. 
(2) Failure to give notice or file proof of loss as required by Subsection (l)(b) does not bar recovery under the 
policy if the insurer fails to show it was prejudiced by the failure. This subsection may not be construed to extend the 
statute of limitations applicable under Section 31A-21-313. 
(3) The insurer shall, on request, promptly furnish an insured any forms or instructions needed to make a proof of 
loss. 
(4) As an alternative to giving notice directly under Subsection (l)(a), it is a sufficient service of notice or of proof 
of loss if a first class postage prepaid envelope addressed to the insurer and containing the proper notice or proof of loss 
is deposited in any United States post office within the time prescribed. 
(5) The commissioner shall adopt rules dealing with notice of loss and proof of loss time limitations under 
insurance policies. Under Section 3IA-21-202, the commissioner's express approval must be received before any 
contract clause requiring notice of loss or proof of loss in a manner inconsistent with the rule may be used in an 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-312 
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insurance contract. 
(6) The acknowledgment by the insurer of the receipt of notice, the furnishing of forms for filing proofs of loss, the 
acceptance of those proofs, or the investigation of any claim are not alone sufficient to waive any of the rights of the 
insurer in defense of any claim arising under the insurance policy. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 31A-21-312, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 148. 
NOTES: CROSS-REFERENCES. -Reports of fires of suspicious origin, § 53-7-214. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Failure to file proof of loss. 
Filing notice of claim. 
FAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF LOSS. 
Insured, who suffered irrecoverable, entire loss of sight in one eye within a few days after a fall, could not delay the 
filing of his proof of loss for nearly three years on ground that he personally did not admit or realize his loss was 
irrecoverable. Hunter v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1971). 
FILING NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
Although notice of claim and proof of loss have similarities, the two are distinct, and fact that notice may have been 
given does not dispense with requirement of furnishing formal proof of loss. Hunter v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 448 
F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1971). 
Insurer established that it suffered actual prejudice due to lack of timely notice of its insured's claim, so that its insured 
could not recover under the exception in Subsection (l)(b). As a result of the insured's failure to timely notify the 
insurer of the occurrences that led to a claim, the insurer did not have the opportunity to investigate the claim, 
participate in a decision to replace a fiber optic line damaged by its insured, or defend against the loss. Utah Transit 
Auth. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., F. Supp. 2d, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76694 (D. Utah Oct. 18,2006). 
Though theft of property from a rental condominium unit was covered by the property manager's general commercial 
liability insurance policy, the insured's failure to give notice of a lawsuit against it insulated the insurer if the insurer 
was prejudiced by the failure. The issue of prejudice was one of fact not suitable for resolution by summary judgment. 
Mullin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 541 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AM. JUR. 2D. —44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1315 et seq. 
C J.S. --46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1245 et seq. 
A.L.R. -Necessity and sufficiency of insurer's demand, under fire insurance policy, for examination of insured or his 
books or papers, or for proofs of loss, certificates, or sworn statements, 4 A.L.R. 3d 631. 
Time within which demand for appraisal of property loss must be made, under insurance policy providing for such 
appraisal, 14 A.L.RJd 674. 
Overvaluation in proof of loss of property insured as fraud avoiding fire insurance policy, 16A.L.R.3d 774. 
Disability insurance or provision: clause requiring notice of claim within specified time or as soon as reasonably 
possible, or the like, 17 A.L.RJd 530. 
"Physical damage": provisions of burglary or theft policy requiring losses evidenced by "physical damage to 
premises," 22 A.L.R.3d 1305. 
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TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 21. INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
PART 3. SPECIFIC CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
UtahCodeAnn. § 31A-21-313 (2009) 
§ 31A-21-313. Limitation of actions 
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance must be commenced within three years after the 
inception of the loss. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (1) or elsewhere in this title, the law applicable to limitation of actions in Title 
78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations, applies to actions on insurance policies. 
(3) An insurance policy may not: 
(a) limit the time for beginning an action on the policy to a time less than that authorized by statute; 
(b) prescribe in what court an action may be brought on the policy; or 
(c) provide that no action may be brought, subject to permissible arbitration provisions in contracts. 
(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the complainant will arise from a delay in bringing 
suit against an insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay itself, no action may be brought against an insurer on an 
insurance policy to compel payment under the policy until the earlier of: 
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as required under the policy; 
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or 
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment. 
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration 
procedure prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to by the parties. 
49-8-201 UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 1014 
PART 2 
SYSTEM AND FUND 
49-8-201. Creation of insurance program. 
There is created for the employees of the state, its educa 
tional institutions, and political subdivisions the "Group In-
surance Program" 1987 
49-8-202. Creation of fund 
There is created the "Group Insurance Trust Fund" for the 
purpose of paying the benefits and the costs of administering 
this program The fund shall consist of all money paid into it 
in accordance with this chapter, whether in the form of cash, 
securities, or other assets, and of all money received from any 
other source Custody, management, and investment of the 
fund shall be governed by Title 49, Chapter 1 1987 
49-8-203. Eligibility for participation in program — 
Optional for certain groups. 
(1) All employers of the state, its educational institutions, 
and political subdivisions are eligible to participate in this 
program, but this section does not require political subdivi-
sions, school districts, or institutions of higher education, 
including technical colleges, to participate in the program 
(2) The Department of Health may participate in this 
program for the purpose of providing program benefits to 
children enrolled in the Utah Children's Health Insurance 
Program created in Title 26, Chapter 40, if the provisions in 
Subsection 26 40 110(4) occur If the Department of Health 
participates in the program under the provisions of this 
Subsection (2), all insurance risk associated with the Chil-
dren's Health Insurance Program shall be the responsibility of 
the Department of Health and not the group insurance divi-
sion or the retirement office 1998 
49-8-204. Group insurance division — Establishment 
of separate risk pools — Rules governing ad-
mission to program 
The group insurance division shall establish 
(1) separate nsk pools for state employees, political 
subdivisions, and, if applicable, children enrolled in the 
Utah Children's Health Insurance Program, created in 
Title 26, Chapter 40, for purposes of providing the benefits 
permitted by this chapter, and 
(2) rules and procedures governing the admission of 
political subdivisions to the program 1998 
PART 3 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
49-8-301. Self-funded program — Contributions by em-
ployer and employee. 
The self-funded program shall be maintained on a finan-
cially and actuarially sound basis by means of contributions 
by the employer and the employee 1987 
MISCELLANEOUS 
49-8-401. Group insurance division — Powers and du-
ties. 
(1) The group insurance division of the retirement office 
shall 
(a) act as a self insurer of employee group benefit plans 
and administer those plans, 
(b) enter into contracts with private insurers to under-
write employee group benefit plans and to reinsure any 
appropriate self-insured plans, 
(c) publish and disseminate descriptions of all em-
ployee benefit plans under this chapter m cooperation 
with the Department of Human Resource Management 
and political subdivisions, 
(d) administer the process of claims administration of 
all employee benefit plans under this chapter or enter into 
contracts, after competitive bids are taken, with other 
benefit administrators to provide for the administration of 
the claims process, 
(e) obtain an annual actuarial evaluation of all self-
insured benefit plans and prepare an annual report for 
the governor and the Legislature describing the employee 
benefit plans being administered by the retirement office 
detailing historical and projected program costs and the 
status of reserve funds, 
(f) consult with the Department of Human Resource 
Management and the executive bodies of other political 
subdivisions to evaluate employee benefit plans and de-
velop recommendations for new or improved benefit 
plans, 
(g) submit annually a budget which includes total 
projected benefit and administrative costs, 
(h) maintain reserves sufficient to liquidate the 
unrevealed claims liability and other liabilities of the 
self-funded employee group benefit plans as estimated by 
the board's consulting actuary, 
d) submit its recommended benefit adjustments for 
state employees upon approval of the board to the director 
of the Department of Human Resource Management The 
Department of Human Resource Management shall in-
clude the benefit adjustments in the total compensation 
plan recommended to the governor required by Subsec-
tion 67-19-12(6Xa), 
(j) adjust benefits, upon approval of the board, and 
upon appropriate notice to the state, its educational 
institutions, and political subdivisions, 
(k) for the purposes of stimulating competition, estab-
lishing better geographical distribution of medical care 
services, and providing alternative health and dental plan 
coverage for both active and retired employees, request 
proposals for alternative health and dental coverage at 
least once every three years, proposals which meet the 
criteria specified in the request shall be offered to active 
and retired state employees and may be offered to active 
and retired employees of political subdivisions at the 
option of the political subdivision, and 
(1) perform the same functions established in Subsec-
tions (l)(a), (b), (d), and (g) for the Department of Health 
if the group insurance division provides program benefits 
to children enrolled in the Utah Children's Health Insur-
ance Program created in Title 26, Chapter 40 
(2) Funds budgeted and expended shall accrue from premi-
ums paid by the various employers Administrative costs may 
not exceed that percentage of premium income which is 
recommended by the board and approved by the governor and 
the Legislature 1998 
49-8-402. Reserves to be held — Refunds. 
In no case may the average total reserves in a given fiscal 
year fall below the level of two months' premiums If substan-
tial excess reserves are accrued above those required by this 
chapter, and the board determines that a refund is appropri-
ate, refunds shall be made to an employer and employee on the 
basis of the contribution of each to the plan The board may 
make a full refund to any employer, other than the state, and 
the employer is responsible for refunding employee contribu-
tions in accordance with this section 1987 
1015 UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 49-9-102 
49-8-403. Assistance to members in purchase of life, 
health, dental, and medical insurance after 
retirement — Employment of personnel to 
administer section — Governor's and legisla-
tive benefit. 
(1) (a) The board may assist active and retired members 
and beneficiaries and inactive members of the various 
retirement systems administered under its direction, to 
purchase life, health, dental, and medical insurance on a 
group basis which can be continued after retirement 
under rules adopted by the board 
(b) The executive director may employ any personnel, 
including consultants, to administer this section 
(2) (a) The board shall annually report and the state shall 
pay the percentage described in Subsection (2Xc) of the 
cost of providing a paid-up group health insurance policy 
for members and their surviving spouses covered under 
Title 49, Chapter 7, Governor's and Legislative Service 
Pension Act who 
d) retire after January 1, 1998, 
(n) are at least 62 but less than 65 years of age, 
(m) elect to receive and apply for this benefit to the 
group insurance division, and 
(iv) are active members at the time of retirement 
or have retired and continued insurance coverage 
with the group insurance division until the date of 
eligibility for the benefit under this Subsection (2) 
(b) The board shall annually report and the state shall 
pay the percentage described in Subsection (2Xc) of the 
cost of providing Medicare supplemental insurance for 
members and their surviving spouses covered under Title 
49, Chapter 7, Governor's and Legislative Service Pension 
Act who 
(i) retire after January 1, 1998, 
(u) are at least 65 years of age, and 
(m) elect to receive and apply for this benefit to the 
group insurance division 
(c) The following percentages apply to the benefit de-
scribed in Subsections (2)(a) and (b) 
0) 100% if the member has 10 or more years of 
service, 
(n) 80% if the member has 8 or more years of 
service, 
(m) 60% if the member has 6 or more years of 
service, and 
(iv) 40% if the member has 4 or more years of 
service 1999 
49-8-404. Audit submitted to Insurance Department. 
The Insurance Department shall biennially audit all funds 
and programs authorized under this chapter and report its 
findings to the governor and the Legislature, but the commis-
sioner may accept the annual audited statement of programs 
under this chapter m lieu of the biennial audit requirement 
2000 
49-8-405. Insurance benefits for employees' beneficia-
ries. 
(1) As used in this section 
(a) "Children" includes stepchildren and legally 
adopted children 
(b) "Line of duty death" means a death resulting from 
external force or violence occasioned by an act of duty as 
an employee 
(2) The beneficiary of an employee who is employed by the 
state and who dies in the line of duty shall receive 
(a) the proceeds of a group term life insurance policy in 
the amount of $50,000 to be purchased by the division and 
paid for by the employing unit, and 
(b) a group health insurance policy paid for by the 
employing unit that covers the employee's 
(I) surviving spouse until remarriage, and 
(II) unmarried children up to the age of 26 
(3) Any political subdivision may provide the benefit under 
Subsection (2) 2000 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
49-9-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Public Employees' 
Disabi l i ty A c t " 1997 
49-9-102. Purpose. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide long-term disabil 
lty benefits for employees of employers participating in any 
system administered by the board except employees covered 
under the Firefighters' Retirement Act, or employees covered 
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under the Public Safety Retirement Act who are covered under 
a long term disability program offered by a political subdivi-
sion which is substantially equivalent to the program offered 
by the state under this chapter The program shall be admin-
istered by the executive officer of the board through the 
retirement office, under the policies and rules promulgated by 
the board 1987 
49-9-103. Definit ions. 
(1) "Date of disability" means the date on which a period of 
continuous disability commences, and may not commence on 
or before the last day of actual work 
(2) "Educational institution" means a political subdivision 
or an instrumentality of a political subdivision, an instrumen-
tality of the state, or any combination of these entities, which 
is primarily engaged in educational activities or the adminis-
tration or servicing of educational activities The term in-
cludes the State Board of Education and any instrumentality 
of the State Board of Education, institutions of higher educa-
tion and their branches, school districts, and vocational and 
technical schools 
(3) "Elimination period" means the three months at the 
beginning of each continuous penod of total disability for 
which no benefit will be paid and commences with the date of 
disability 
(4) "Employee" means any regular full-time employee of an 
employer who participates in any system administered by the 
board, except those employees exempt from coverage under 
Section 49 9-102 
(5) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum period 
of time the monthly disability income benefit will be paid for 
any continuous period of total disability 
(6) "Medically determinable impairment" means an impair 
ment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psycho-
logical abnormalities which can be shown by medically accept-
able clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques A physical 
or mental impairment must be established by medical evi-
dence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, 
not only by the individual's statement of symptoms 
(7) "Physician" means a legally qualified physician 
(8) "Rehabilitative employment" means any board-ap-
proved occupation or employment for wage or profit, for which 
the employee is reasonably qualified by education, training, or 
experience, in which the employee engages while unable to 
perform his occupation as a result of injury or illness 
(9) "Total disability" means the complete inability, due to 
medically determinable physical or mental impairment, to 
engage in the employee's regular occupation during the elimi-
nation period and the first 24 months of disability benefits 
Thereafter, "total disability" means the complete inability, 
based solely on medically determinable physical impairment, 
to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable, 
considering the employee's education, training, and experi-
ence "Total disability" exists only if during any period of "total 
disability" the employee is under the regular care of a physi-
cian other than the employee 2000 
PART 2 
THE PROGRAM AND FUND 
49-9-201. Creation of program. 
There is created for employees of employers participating in 
any system administered by the board, unless otherwise 
exempted under this chapter, the "Public Employees' Long 
Term Disability Program " 1988 
49-9-202. Crea t ion of t r u s t fund. 
There is created the "Public Employees' Disability Trust 
Fund" for the purpose of paying the benefits and costs of 
administering this program The fund shall consist of all 
money paid into it in accordance with this chapter, whether m 
the form of cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money 
received from any other source Custody, management, and 
investment of the fund shall be governed by Title 49, Chapter 
1 1987 
49-9-203. Eligibility for membership in the program. 
(1) All employers participating in any system administered 
by the board may cover their employees under this chapter, 
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement 
Act 
(2) If an employer elects to cover any of his eligible employ-
ees under this chapter, all of those employees shall be covered, 
except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement 
Act 
(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any political subdivi-
sion or educational institution to be covered by this chapter 
1992 
PART 3 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
49-9-301. Contributions to fund program — Adjust-
ment of premium rate. 
(1) During each legislative session, the board shall certify 
to the Legislature the employer paid premium rate expressed 
as a percentage of salary which is required to fund the Public 
Employees' Disability Trust Fund 
(2) Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall 
adjust the premium rate to maintain adequate funding for the 
disability trust fund 1994 
49-9-302. Rates established on basis of agency experi-
ence — Limitations — Annual report to gov-
ernor and Legislature. 
The board shall establish the contribution rate based on the 
experience of the various public agencies and political subdi-
visions participating in the program, which rate may not 
exceed 1% of salaries and wages and shall report annually to 
the governor and the Legislature the current contribution 
rates assessed to the public agencies and political subdivi-
sions 1987 
PART 4 
BENEFITS 
49-9-401. Disability benefits — Proof required — Eligi-
bility. 
(1) Upon receipt of proof by the board from the employer 
that an employee has become totally disabled as a result of 
(a) accidental bodily injury which is the sole cause of 
disability and is sustained while this chapter is in force, 
(b) disease or illness causing total disability commenc-
ing while this chapter is in force, or 
(c) physical injury resulting from external force or 
violence as a result of the performance of duty, the fund 
will pay to the employee a monthly disability benefit for 
each month the total disability continues beyond the 
elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benefit 
period 
(2) Successive periods of disability which (a) result from 
the same or related causes, (b) are separated by less than six 
months of continuous full-time work at the individual's usual 
place of employment, and (c) commence while the individual is 
an employee covered by this chapter, shall be considered as a 
single period of disability The inability to work for a period 
less than 15 consecutive days may not be considered as a 
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period of disability Otherwise, successive periods of disability 
shall be considered as separate periods of disability 
(3) The board may, at any time, have any employee claim-
ing disability examined by a physician chosen by the board to 
determine if the employee is disabled, and if so, the extent of 
the disability 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4Kb), any claim 
brought by an employee for long-term disability benefits 
under the Public Employee's Disability Program is barred 
if it is not commenced within one year from the employee's 
date of disability 
(b) If an employee fails to commence a claim for long-
term disability benefits within the time limitations pre-
scribed by Subsection (4Xa), the board may permit an 
employee to commence a claim for long-term disability 
benefits if the employee demonstrates that under the 
surrounding facts and circumstances the employee's fail-
ure to comply with the time limitations was reasonable 
(5) Benefits for disability based primarily on psychopathy 
shall be determined in accordance with Section 49-9 406 
(6) Medical or psychological conditions which existed prior 
to enrollment shall not be a basis for disability benefits until 
the employee has had one year of continuous enrollment in the 
Public Employees Long-Term Disability Program 1999 
49-9-402. Calculation of disability benefit — Reduction 
of benefit — Circumstances — Eligibility for 
benefits — Application required. 
(1) (a) The monthly income disability benefit is two-thirds 
of the regular monthly salary paid as of the last day of 
actual service for the disabilities defined in Subsections 
49-9-401(l)(a) and (b) and 100% of the regular monthly 
salary paid as of the last day of actual service for the 
disabilities defined in Subsection 49-9-401(l)(c) 
(b) Payments may not be made by the fund for any 
period of disability unless the employee is under the 
regular care and treatment of a physician 
(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced 
by any amount received by, or due to, the employee from the 
following sources for the same period of time during which the 
employee is entitled to receive the monthly disability benefit. 
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by 
the employee, the employee's spouse, and the employee's 
dependent children, except that if Social Security benefits 
are increased to compensate for a change in the Consumer 
Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may 
not be further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits 
determined at the level in effect at the time of the 
commencement of benefits, 
(b) workers' compensation, 
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs, 
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs, 
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan 
providing disability income benefits for which contribu-
tions or payroll deductions are made by the employer; 
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or 
disability program for which the employee is eligible, 
(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or 
settlement from a third party liable to the employee for 
the disability, and 
(h) unemployment compensation benefits 
(3) Any amounts received by, or payable to, the employee 
from one or more of the sources under Subsection (2) shalL be 
considered as amounts received by the employee whether or 
not the amounts were actually received by the employee 
(4) (a) In order to be eligible for benefits under this chapter 
the employee shall first apply for all disability benefits 
from governmental entities under Subsection (2) to which 
the employee is or may be entitled 
(b) The employee shall also first apply at the earlies 
eligible age for all retirement benefits to which the em 
ployee is or may be entitled 
(c) If the employee fails to apply, the board may apprj 
on behalf of the employee 
(d) The board may treat as income any amount th< 
employee is entitled to receive but does not receive be 
cause application for benefits is not made by the employe* 
and may reduce the monthly disability accordingly 199 
49-9-403. Termination of disability benefits — Calcula 
t ion of retirement benefit. 
(1) Any member, including an employee who relinquishe 
rights to retirement benefits pursuant to Section 49-1-4QJ 
who applies and is qualified for disability benefits shall receiv 
a disability allowance until the earlier of 
(a) the date the member or employee who relinquishe 
rights to retirement benefits has accumulated 
(I) 20 years of service credit if the member 1 
covered by Chapters 4 or 4a, Public Safety Retin 
ment and Noncontnbutory Retirement Acts, 
(II) 25 years if the member is covered by Chapter ( 
Judges' Retirement Act, or 
(III) 30 years if the member is covered by Chapter 
2 or 3, Public Employees' Retirement and Noncor 
tnbutory Retirement Acts, or 
(b) the member has received disability benefits for th 
following applicable time penods 
(I) if the member is under age 60, the disabilit 
allowance is payable until age 65, 
(II) if the member is 60-61, the disability allowanc 
is payable for five years, 
(III) if the member is 62-63, the disability allov 
ance is payable for four years, 
(IV) if the member is 64-65, the disability allov, 
ance is payable for three years, 
(v) if the member is 66-68, the disability allowanc 
is payable for two years, and 
(vi) if the member is age 69 or older, the disabilit 
benefit is payable for one year 
(2) Upon termination of disability benefits, the disable 
employee shall retire under the retirement system whic 
covered the employee at the time of disability The fini 
average salary used in the calculation of the retiremei 
benefit shall be based on the annual rate of pay at the time 
disability, improved by the annual cost-of-living increase fa 
tor applied to retired participants in the system which covert 
the employee at the time of disability Retirement credit sha 
accrue during the period of disability unless the disable 
employee is exempted from the system 
(3) An employee who is in a position covered by a syste 
administered by the board, but has relinquished rights 
retirement benefits pursuant to Section 49-1-405, may recei\ 
the benefit the employee would have received by full partic 
patron in the system covering the employee on the date 
disability, except for the accrual of service credit, in acco 
dance with this title 
(4) An employee receiving disability benefits who has yea 
of service credit from two or more systems or plans admini 
tered by the board may not combine these credits und 
Section 49-1-406 in determining eligibility for retiremen 
unless the employee would receive a greater retirement be 
efit by combining such credits 19 
49-9-404. Annual adjustment to disability benefit. 
An employee receiving disability benefits shall receive 1 
annual adjustment on the employee's anniversary date 
reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index as computed 1 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics The adjustment shall 1 
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(4) (a) The cost of providing the allowance under this 
section shall be funded in fiscal year 1987-88 by a supple-
mental appropriation in the 1988 General Session based 
on the retirement contribution rate increase established 
by the consulting actuary and approved by the board. 
(b) The cost of providing the allowance under this 
section shall be funded beginning July 1, 1988, by means 
of an increase in the retirement contribution rate estab-
lished by the consulting actuary and approved by the 
board. 
(c) The rate increase under Subsections (4)(a) and (b) 
shall be funded: 
(i) for state employees, by an appropriation from 
the account established by the Division of Finance 
under Subsection (4)(d), which is funded by savings 
derived from this early retirement incentive and a 
work force reduction; 
(ii) for school employees, by direct contributions 
from the employing unit, which may not be funded 
through an increase in the retirement contribution 
amount established in Title 53A, Chapter 17a, Mini-
mum School Program Act; and 
(iii) for political subdivisions under Level B, by 
direct contributions by the participating employer. 
(d) (i) Each year, any excess savings derived from this 
early retirement incentive which are above the costs 
of funding the increase and the costs of paying 
insurance, sick leave, compensatory leave, and vaca-
tion leave under Subsections (4)(c)(i) and (c)(ii) shall 
be reported to the Legislature and shall be appropri-
ated as provided by law. 
(ii) In the case of Subsection (4)(c)(i), the Division 
of Finance shall establish an account into which all 
savings derived from this early retirement incentive 
shall be deposited as the savings are realized. 
(iii) In the case of Subsection (4)(c)(ii), the State 
Office of Education shall certify the amount of sav-
ings derived from this early retirement incentive. 
(iv) The State Office of Education and the partici-
pating employer may not spend the savings until 
appropriated by the Legislature as provided by law. 
5) A member who retires under this section is subject to 
•tion 49-11-504. 
S) The board may make rules to administer this section. 
7) The Legislative Auditor General shall perform an audit 
nsure compliance with this section. 2002 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
49-14-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Public Safety Contributory 
Retirement Act." 2002 
49-14-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) (a) "Compensation" means the total amount of pay-
ments that are includable in gross income which are 
received by a public safety service employee as base 
income for the regularly scheduled work period. The 
participating employer shall establish the regularly 
scheduled work period. Base income shall be deter-
mined prior to the deduction of member contributions 
or any amounts the public safety service employee 
authorizes to be deducted for salary deferral or other 
benefits authorized by federal law. 
(b) "Compensation" includes performance-based 
bonuses and cost-of-livmg adjustments. 
(c) "Compensation" does not include: 
(1) overtime; 
(ii) sick pay incentives; 
(iii) retirement pay incentives; 
(iv) the monetary value of remuneration paid 
in kind, including a residence, use of equipment 
or uniform, travel, or similar payments; 
(v) a lump-sum payment or special payments 
covering accumulated leave; and 
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(vi) all contributions made by a participating 
employer under this system or under any other 
employee benefit system or plan maintained by a 
participating employer for the benefit of a mem-
ber or participant, 
(d) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter 
may not exceed the amount allowed under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 401(a)(17). 
(2) "Final average salary" means the amount computed 
by averaging the highest three years of annual compen-
sation preceding retirement, subject to Subsections (2)(a) 
and (b). 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2Kb), the 
percentage increase in annual compensation in any 
one of the years used may not exceed the previous 
year's compensation by more than 10% plus a cost-
of-living adjustment equal to the decrease in the 
purchasing power of the dollar during the previous 
year, as measured by a United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index average as 
determined by the board. 
(b) In cases where the participating employer pro-
vides acceptable documentation to the office, the 
limitation in Subsection (2)(a) may be exceeded if: 
(i) the public safety service employee has 
transferred from another agency; or 
(ii) the public safety service employee has 
been promoted to a new position. 
(3) "Line-of-duty death" means a death resulting from 
external force, violence, or disease occasioned by an act of 
duty as a public safety service employee. 
(4) "Participating employer" means an employer which 
meets the participation requirements of Section 49-14-
201. 
(5) (a) "Public safety service" means employment nor-
mally requiring an average of 2,080 hours of regu-
larly scheduled employment per year rendered by a 
member who is a: 
(i) law enforcement officer in accordance with 
Section 53-13-103; 
(ii) correctional officer in accordance with Sec-
tion 53-13-104; and 
(hi) special function officer approved in accor-
dance with Sections 49-14-201 and 53-13-105. 
(b) "Public safety service" also requires that in the 
course of employment the employee's life or personal 
safety is at risk. 
(c) Except for the minimum hour requirement, 
Subsections (5)(a) and (b) do not apply to any person 
who was eligible for service credit in this system prior 
to January 1, 1984. 
(6) "Public safety service employee" means an em-
ployee of a participating employer who performs public 
safety service under this chapter. 
(7) "System" means the Public Safety Contributory 
Retirement System created under this chapter. 
(8) "Years of service credit" means the number of peri-
ods, each to consist of 12 full months as determined by the 
board, whether consecutive or not, during which a public 
safety service employee was employed by a participating 
employer, including time the public safety service em-
ployee was absent in the service of the United States 
government on military duty. 2003 
49-14-103. Creation of sys tem. 
There is created for members performing public safety 
service and who are employed by a participating employer the 
"Public Safety Contributory Retirement System." 2002 
49-14-104. Creation of trust fund. 
(1) There is created the "Public Safety Contributory R ef 
ment Trust Fund" for the purpose of paying the benefits ^ 
the costs of administering this system. 
(2) The fund shall consist of a number of individual tru + 
accounts created as needed to receive the money and ass t 
transferred into them from the respective terminated system 
all money paid into them, including interest, in accordan ' 
with this chapter, whether in the form of cash, secunties 
other assets, and of all money received from any other source 
(3) Custody, management, and investment of the fund shall 
be governed by Chapter 11, Utah State Retirement Systems 
Administration. 2002 
PART 2 
MEMBERSHIP ELIGIBILITY 
49-14-201. System membership — Eligibility. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 49-15-201, a public safety 
service employee of a participating employer participating in 
this system is eligible for service credit in this system at the 
earliest of: 
(a) July 1, 1969, if the public safety service employee 
was employed by the participating employer on July 1, 
1969, and the participating employer was participating in 
this system on that date; 
(b) the date the participating employer begins partici-
pating in this system if the public safety service employee 
was employed by the participating employer on that date; 
or 
(c) the date the public safety service employee is em-
ployed by the participating employer and is eligible to 
perform public safety service. 
(2) (a) (i) A participating employer that has public safety 
service and firefighter service employees that require 
cross-training and duty shall enroll those dual pur-
pose employees in the system in which the greatest 
amount of time is actually worked. 
(ii) The employees shall either be full-time public 
safety service or full-time firefighter service employ-
ees of the participating employer, 
(b) (i) Prior to transferring a dual purpose employee 
from one system to another, the participating em-
ployer shall receive written permission from the 
office 
(ii) The office may request documentation to verify 
the appropriateness of the transfer. 
(3) The board may combine or segregate the actuarial 
experience of participating employers in this system for the 
purpose of setting contribution rates. 
(4) (a) (i) Each participating employer participating in 
this system shall annually submit to the office a 
schedule indicating the positions to be covered under 
this system in accordance with this chapter. 
(ii) The office may require documentation to justify 
the inclusion of any position under this system. 
(b) If there is a dispute between the office and a 
participating employer or employee over any position to 
be covered, the disputed position shall be submitted to the 
Peace Officer Standards and Training Council established 
under Section 53-6-106 for determination. 
(c) (i) The Peace Officer Standards and Training Coun-
cil's authority to decide eligibility for public safety 
service credit is limited to claims for coverage under 
this system for time periods after July 1, 1989 
(ii) A decision of the Peace Officer Standards and 
Training Council may not be applied to service credit 
earned in another system prior to July 1, 1989. 
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member's member contributions shall be paid to the benefi-
ciary. 
(4) The combined payments to beneficiaries of any member 
under this section may not exceed 75% of the member's final 
average monthly salary. 2003 
49-15-503. Benefits payable upon death of inactive 
member. 
(1) If an inactive member who has less than 20 years of 
public safety service credit dies, the spouse at the time of 
death, or, if there is no spouse at the time of death, the 
member's minor children shall receive a refund of the mem-
ber's member contributions or $500, whichever is greater. 
(2) (a) If an inactive member with 20 or more years of 
public safety service credit dies, the spouse at the time of 
death shall receive an allowance in an amount of 50% of 
the amount the member would have received had retire-
ment occurred on the first of the month following the 
month in which the death occurred. 
(b) This allowance shall be based on years of service 
credit and final average monthly salary under Section 
49-15-402, reduced actuarially from age 50 to the age of 
the member at the time of death if the member is under 50 
years of age at the time of death. 2003 
49-15-504. Benefits payable upon death of retired 
member. 
(1) If a retiree who retired under either Division A or 
Division B dies, the retiree's spouse at the time of death shall 
receive an allowance equal to 65% of the allowance that was 
being paid to the retiree at the time of death. 
(2) If the retiree retired solely under Division B and dies 
leaving unmarried children under the age of 18 or dependent 
unmarried mentally or physically disabled children, the chil-
dren shall qualify for a benefit as prescribed under Subsection 
49-15-502(l)(d) which is payable on the first day of the month 
following the month in which the retiree died. 2003 
49-15-505. Benefits for surviving spouse under Divi-
sion A or Division B. 
The spouse at the time of death, if eligible, shall receive a 
benefit computed under either Division A or Division B, 
whichever provides the larger benefit, but may not receive a 
benefit under both divisions if it would result in a duplicate 
benefit. 2002 
49-15-506. Benefits payable upon death of active or 
inactive member without spouse or minor 
children. 
If an active or inactive member dies and at the time of death 
the member does not have a spouse or minor children, the 
benefit payable to a designated beneficiary is a refund of the 
member's member contributions or $500, whichever is larger. 
2003 
PART 6 
DISABILITY 
49-15-601. Long-term disability coverage. 
Each participating employer shall cover its public safety 
employees under Title 49, Chapter 21, Public Employees' 
Long-Term Disability Act, or a substantially similar long-term 
disability program. 2003 
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Suspension of benefit upon settlement of 
workers' compensation claim. 
Part 7 
Volunteer Firefighters 
Volunteer firefighters eligible for line-of-duty 
death and disability benefits in Division A 
— Computation of benefit. 
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(2) The beneficiary of a covered individual who is employed 
by the state and who has a line-of-duty death shall receive: 
(a) the proceeds of a $50,000 group term life insurance 
policy paid for by the state and administered and provided 
as part of the group life insurance program under this 
chapter; and 
(b) group health coverage paid for by the state that 
covers the covered individual's: 
(i) surviving spouse until remarriage or becoming 
eligible for Medicare, whichever comes first; and 
(ii) unmarried children up to the age of 26. 
(3) A covered employer not required to provide the benefits 
under Subsection (2) may provide either or both of the benefits 
under Subsection (2) by paying rates established by the 
program. 
(4) The benefit provided under Subsection (2)(a) is subject 
to the same terms and conditions as the group life insurance 
program provided under this chapter. 2003 
49-20-407. Insurance mandates. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection 31A-1-
103(3)(f), health coverage offered to the state employee risk 
pool under Subsection 49-20-202(l)(a) shall comply with the 
provisions of Sections 31A-8-501 and 31A-22-605.5. 2004 
49-20-408. Prohibition against certain uses of Social 
Security numbers. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection 31A-1-
103(3)(f), health, dental, medical, Medicare supplement, or 
conversion coverage offered under Section 49-20-202 shall 
comply with the provisions of Section 31A-22-634. 2003 
49-20-409. Long-term disability — Cost of health cov-
erage waiver. 
(1) Under the direction of the board, the program shall 
provide a waiver of the cost of health insurance coverage for 
state employees who receive a monthly disability benefit 
under Title 49, Chapter 21, Public Employees' Long-Term 
Disability Act. 
(2) A participating employer, other than the state, may elect 
to provide a waiver for its employees similar to the waiver 
provided under Subsection (1). 2005 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
49-21-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Public Employees' Long-Term 
Disability Act." 2002 
49-21-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Date of disability" means the date on which a 
period of continuous disability commences, and may not 
commence on or before the last day of actual work. 
(2) "Elimination period" means the three months at the 
beginning of each continuous period of total disability for 
which no benefit will be paid. The elimination period 
begins on the nearest first day of the month from the date 
of disability. The elimination period may include a one-
time trial return to work period of less than 15 consecu-
tive calendar days. 
(3) (a) "Eligible employee" means: 
(i) any regular full-time employee as defined 
under Section 49-12-102 or 49-13-102, public 
safety service employee as defined under Section 
49-14-102 or 49-15-102, or judge as defined under 
Section 49-17-102 or 49-18-102, whose employer 
provides coverage under this chapter, or the 
governor of the state; and 
(ii) an employee who is covered by a retire-
ment program offered by the Teachers' Insurance 
and Annuity Association of America, if the em-
ployee's employer provides coverage under this 
chapter; and 
(b) "Eligible employee" does not include any em-
ployee that is exempt from coverage under Section 
49-21-201. 
(4) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum 
period of time the monthly disability income benefit will 
be paid under Section 49-21-403 for any continuous period 
of total disability. 
(5) "Monthly disability benefit" means the monthly 
payments and accrual of service credit under Section 
49-21-401. 
(6) "Objective medical impairment" means an impair-
ment resulting from an injury or illness which is diag-
nosed by a physician and which is based on accepted 
objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective 
complaints. 
(7) "Physician" means a licensed physician. 
(8) "Regular monthly salary" means the amount certi-
fied by the participating employer as the monthly salary 
of the eligible employee, unless there is a discrepancy 
between the certified amount and the amount actually 
paid, in which case the office shall determine the regular 
monthly salary. 
(9) "Regu la r occupat ion" m e a n s e i t he r t h e p r i m a r y du-
t ies nPrformpH hv tllP plicrihlA o m n l n m o f/vr 4-Vto fwckliro 
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months preceding the date of disability, or a permanent 
assignment of duty to the eligible employee. 
(10) "Rehabilitative employment" means any occupa-
tion or employment for wage or profit, for which the 
eligible employee is reasonably qualified to perform based 
on education, training, or experience while unable to 
perform the employee's regular occupation. 
(11) (a) "Total disability" or "totally disabled" means 
the complete inability, due to objective medical im-
pairment, whether physical or mental, to engage in 
the eligible employee's regular occupation during the 
elimination period and the first 24 months of disabil-
ity benefits. 
(b) "Total disability" means, after the elimination 
period and the first 24 months of disability benefits, 
the complete inability, based solely on physical objec-
tive medical impairment, to engage in any gainful 
occupation which is reasonable, considering the eligi-
ble employee's education, training, and experience. 
2005 
49-21 -103. Creation of program. 
There is created for eligible employees the "Public Employ-
ees' Long-Term Disability Program." 2002 
49-21-104. Creation of trust fund. 
(1) There is created the "Public Employees' Long-Term 
Disability Trust Fund" for the purpose of paying the benefits 
and costs of administering this program. 
(2) The fund shall consist of all money and interest paid 
into it in accordance with this chapter, whether in the form of 
cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money received 
from any other source. 
(3) Custody, management, and investment of the fund shall 
be governed by Chapter 11, Utah State Retirement Systems 
Administration. 2002 
49-21-105. Purpose. 
(1) The purpose of this chapter is to provide long-term 
disability benefits for eligible employees. 
(2) The program shall be administered by the office, under 
policies and rules adopted by the board. 2002 
PART 2 
MEMBERSHIP ELIGIBILITY 
49-21-201. Program membership — Eligibility. 
(1) The state shall cover all of its eligible employees under 
this chapter. 
(2) Except as provided under Subsections (5), (6), and (7), 
all other employers may provide coverage for their eligible 
employees under this chapter 
(3) If an employer elects to cover any of its eligible employ-
ees under this chapter, all of its eligible employees shall be 
covered. 
(4) Nothing m this chapter requires any employer other 
than the state to cover its eligible employees under this 
chapter. 
(5) Firefighter service employees, as defined under Section 
49-16-102, are not eligible for coverage under this chapter. 
(6) Public safety service employees, as defined in Sections 
49-14-102 and 49-15-102, who are covered under a long-term 
disability program offered by an employer which is substan-
tially similar to this program are not eligible for coverage 
under this chapter 
(7) Legislators are not eligible for coverage under this 
chapter. 2002 
PART 3 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
49-21-301. Contributions to fund program — Adjust-
ment of premium rate. 
(1) During each legislative session, the board shall certify 
to the Legislature the employer paid premium rate expressed 
as a percentage of salary which is required to fund the Public 
Employees' Long-Term Disability Trust Fund. 
(2) Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall 
adjust the premium rate to maintain adequate funding for the 
Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Trust Fund. 2002 
PART 4 
DISABILITY BENEFITS 
49-21-401. Disability benefits — Application — Eligibil-
ity. 
(1) An eligible employee shall apply for long-term disability 
benefits under this chapter by: 
(a) completing an application form prepared by the 
office; 
(b) signing a consent form allowing the office access to 
the eligible employee's medical records; and 
(c) providing any documentation or information rea-
sonably requested by the office. 
(2) Upon request by the office, the participating employer of 
the eligible employee shall provide to the office documentation 
and information concerning the eligible employee. 
(3) The office shall review all relevant information and 
determine whether or not the eligible employee is totally 
disabled. 
(4) If the office determines that the eligible employee is 
totally disabled due to accidental bodily injury or physical 
illness which is not the result of the performance of an 
employment duty, the eligible employee shall receive a 
monthly disability benefit equal to % of the eligible employee's 
regular monthly salary, for each month the total disability 
continues beyond the elimination period, not to exceed the 
maximum benefit period. 
(5) If the office determines that the eligible employee is 
totally disabled due to psychiatric illness, the eligible em-
ployee shall receive: 
(a) a maximum of two years of monthly disability 
benefits equal to % of the eligible employee's regular 
monthly salary for each month the total disability contin-
ues beyond the elimination period; 
(b) a maximum of $10,000 for psychiatric expenses, 
including rehabilitation expenses preauthorized by the 
office's consultants, paid during the period of monthly 
disability benefits; and 
(c) payment of monthly disability benefits according to 
contractual provisions for a period not to exceed five years 
if the eligible employee is institutionalized due to psychi-
atric illness. 
(6) If the office determines that the eligible employee is 
totally disabled due to a physical injury resulting from exter-
nal force or violence as a result of the performance of an 
employment duty, the eligible employee shall receive a 
monthly disability benefit equal to 100% of the eligible em-
ployee's regular monthly salary, for each month the total 
disability continues beyond the elimination period, not to 
exceed the maximum benefit period. 
(7) (a) Successive periods of disability are considered as a 
continuous period of disability if the period of disability: 
(i) results from the same or related causes; 
(ii) is separated by less than six months of contin-
uous full-time work at the individual's usual place of 
employment; and 
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(iii) commences while the individual is an eligible 
employee covered by this chapter. 
(b) The inability to work for a period of less than 15 
consecutive days is not considered as a period of disability. 
(c) If Subsection (7)(a) or (b) does not apply, successive 
periods of disability are considered as separate periods of 
disability. 
(8) The office may, at any time, have any eligible employ 3e 
claiming disability examined by a physician chosen by the 
office to determine if the eligible employee is totally disabled. 
(9) A claim brought by an eligible employee for long-term 
disability benefits under the Public Employee's Long-Term 
Disability Program is barred if it is not commenced within one 
year from the eligible employee's date of disability, unless the 
office determines that under the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances, the eligible employee's failure to comply with the 
time limitations was reasonable. 
(10) Medical or psychiatric conditions which existed prior to 
enrollment may not be a basis for disability benefits until the 
eligible employee has had one year of continuous enrollment 
in the Public Employees Long-Term Disability Program. 
(11) If there is a valid benefit protection contract, service 
credit shall accrue during the period of total disability, unless 
the disabled eligible employee is exempted from a system, or is 
otherwise ineligible for service credit. 2003 
49-21-402. Reduct ion of benefit — Circumstances — 
Application for other benefits required. 
(1) A monthly disability benefit may not be paid for any 
period of total disability unless the eligible employee is under 
the ongoing care and treatment of a physician other than the 
eligible employee. 
(2) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any 
amount received by, or payable to, the eligible employee from 
the following sources for the same period of time during which 
the eligible employee is entitled to receive a monthly disability 
benefit: 
(a) Social Security disability benefits, including all ben-
efits received by the eligible employee, the eligible em-
ployee's spouse, and the eligible employee's children as 
determined by the Social Security Administration; 
(b) workers' compensation indemnity benefits; 
(c) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or 
settlement from a third party liable to the employee for 
the disability; 
(d) unemployment compensation benefits; and 
(e) automobile no-fault, medical payments, or similar 
insurance payments. 
(3) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any 
amount in excess of Vs of the eligible employee's regular 
monthly salary received by, or payable to, the eligible em-
ployee from the following sources for the same period of time 
during which the eligible employee is entitled to receive a 
monthly disability benefit: 
(a) any employer-sponsored retirement programs; and 
(b) any disability benefit resulting from the disability 
for which benefits are being received under this chapter. 
(4) Cost-of-living increases to any of the benefits listed in 
Subsection (2) may not be considered in calculating a reduc-
tion to the monthly disability benefit. 
(5) Any amounts payable to the eligible employee from one 
or more of the sources under Subsection (2) are considered as 
amounts received whether or not the amounts were actually 
received by the eligible employee 
(6) (a) An eligible employee shall first apply for all disabil-
ity benefits from governmental entities under Subsection 
(2) to which the eligible employee is or may be entitled, 
and provide to the office evidence of the applications 
(b) The eligible employee shall also first apply at the 
earliest eligible age for all unreduced retirement benefits 
to which the eligible employee is or may be entitled, and 
provide to the office evidence of the application. 
(c) If the eligible employee fails to make application 
under Subsection (6)(a) or (b), the monthly disability 
benefit shall be suspended. 2005 
49-21-403. Termination of disability benefits — Calcu-
lation of retirement benefit. 
(1) An eligible employee covered by this chapter and eligi-
ble for service credit under a system, including an eligible 
employee who relinquishes rights to retirement benefits under 
Section 49-11-619, who applies and is qualified for a monthly 
disability benefit shall receive a monthly disability benefit 
until the earlier of: 
(a) the date the eligible employee has accumulated: 
(i) 20 years of service credit if the eligible employee 
is covered by Chapter 14, Public Safety Contributory 
Retirement Act, or Chapter 15, Public Safety Noncon-
tributory Retirement Act; 
(ii) 25 years of service credit if the eligible em-
ployee is covered by Chapter 17, Judges' Contributory 
Retirement Act, or Chapter 18, Judges' Noncontribu-
tory Retirement Act; or 
(iii) 30 years of service credit if the eligible em-
ployee is covered by Chapter 12, Public Employees' 
Contributory Retirement Act, or Chapter 13, Public 
Employees' Noncontributory Retirement Act; or 
(b) the date the eligible employee has received a 
monthly disability benefit for the following applicable 
time periods: 
(i) if the eligible employee is under age 60, the 
monthly disability benefit is payable until age 65; 
(ii) if the eligible employee is 60 or 61 years of age 
on the date of disability, the monthly disability ben-
efit is payable for five years; 
(iii) if the eligible employee is 62 or 63 years of age 
on the date of disability, the monthly disability ben-
efit is payable for four years; 
(iv) if the eligible employee is 64 or 65 years of age 
on the date of disability, the monthly disability ben-
efit is payable for three years; 
(v) if the eligible employee is 66, 67, or 68 years of 
age on the date of disability, the monthly disability 
benefit is payable for two years; and 
(vi) if the eligible employee is 69 years of age or 
older on the date of disability, the monthly disability 
benefit is payable for one year. 
(2) (a) Upon termination of a monthly disability benefit, an 
eligible employee eligible for service credit under a system 
may retire under the system which covered the eligible 
employee on the date of disability. 
(b) The final average salary used in the calculation of 
the allowance shall be based on the annual rate of pay on 
the date of disability, improved by the annual cost-of-
living increase factor applied to retirees of the system 
which covered the eligible employee on the date of disabil-
ity 
(3) An eligible employee who is eligible for service credit in 
a system, but has relinquished rights to an allowance under 
Section 49-11-619, may receive the benefits the eligible em-
ployee would have received by being eligible for service credit 
in the system covering the eligible employee on the date of 
disability, except for the accrual of service credit, in accor-
dance with this title. 
(4) An eligible employee receiving a monthly disability 
benefit who has service credit from two or more systems may 
not combine service credits under Section 49-11-405 in quali-
fying for retirement, unless the eligible employee would re-
ceive a greater allowance by combining the service credits. 
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SUBJECT: Separation or Retirement for Physical Disability 
References: (a) DoD Directive 1332.18, "Separation from the Military Service by 
Reason of Physical Disability," February 25, 1986 (hereby canceled) 
(b) Title 10, United States Code 
(c) Sections 3502, 5532, 6308, and 8332 of title 5, United States Code 
(d) Section 104 of title 26, United States Code 
(e) through (h), see enclosure 1 
1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE 
This Directive: 
1.1. Reissues reference (a) to update policy and responsibilities for separation or 
retirement for physical disability under reference (b) and related determinations under 
references (c) and (d). 
1.2. Incorporates policy and responsibility for conduct of Ready Reserve physical 
examinations and certification of physical condition under Section 10206 of reference 
(b). 
1.3. Authorizes procedures under DoD Instruction 1332.38 reference (e)) and DoD 
Instruction 1332.39 (reference (f)) for the DoD Disability Evaluation System (DES). 
1.4. Establishes policy for processing Active and Reserve component members who 
have conditions that are cause for referral for physical disability evaluation. 
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2. APPLICABILITY 
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments 
(including the Coast Guard when it is operating as a Military Service in the Navy), the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commands (hereafter referred 
to collectively as "the DoD Components"). The term "Military Services," as used herein, 
refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. 
3. POLICY 
It is DoD policy that: 
3.1. The DES shall be the mechanism for implementing retirement or separation 
because of physical disability in accordance with Chapter 61 of 10 U.S.C. (reference (b)). 
^ l ^ T h e DES shall consist of four elements: medical evaluation; physical disability 
evaluation, to include appellate review; counseling; and final disposition. 
3.3. The sole standard to be used in making determinations of unfitness due to 
physical disability shall be unfitness to perform the duties of the member's office, grade, 
rank or rating because of disease or injury. In addition, retirement or separation because 
of physical disability requires determinations that the disability: 
3.3.1. Further: 
3.3.1.1. In the case of a member on active duty for more than 3 0 days, 
was incurred while the member was entitled to basic pay, or any other member of the 
Armed Forces, after September 23, 1996, who is on active duty but is not entitled to basic 
pay under 37 U.S.C. 502(b) (reference (g)) due to authorized absence to participate in an 
educational program, or for an emergency purpose, as determined by the Secretary 
concerned; or 
3.3.1.2. In the case of a member on active duty for 30 days or less, is the 
proximate result of, or was incurred in line of duty after September 23, 1996, as a result 
of: 
3.3.1.2.1. Performing active duty or inactive duty training; 
3.3.1.2.2. Traveling directly to or from the place at which such duty 
is performed; or 
3.3.1.2.3. After September 23, 1996, an injury illness, or disease 
incurred or aggravated while remaining overnight, between successive periods of inactive 
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duty training, at or in the vicinity of the site of the inactive duty training, if the site is 
outside reasonable commuting distance of the member's residence. 
3.3.2. Is of a permanent nature. 
3.3.3. Was not the result of intentional misconduct or willful neglect and was 
not incurred during a period of unauthorized absence. 
3.4. Each member of the Ready Reserve shall be examined as to his or her physical 
fitness every five years, or more often if the Secretary concerned considers it necessary, 
and, if not on extended active duty or full-time National Guard duty, shall execute and 
submit annually to the Secretary concerned a certificate of physical condition. Each 
member of the Standby Reserve shall, in accordance with procedures established by the 
Secretary, execute and submit annually a certificate of physical condition. 
3.5. Any member of the Ready Reserve who is pending separation for a non-duty 
related impairment or condition shall be afforded the opportunity to enter the DES for a 
determination of fitness. If determined fit, the Secretary concerned may deem the 
member medically qualified for retention in the Ready Reserve in the specialty for which 
he or she was found fit. 
3.6. Service members who have conditions that are cause for referral into the DES 
shall be processed in a timely manner. In no case shall timely disposition from the 
Service result in denial of transition and leave entitlements provided by statute. 
3.7. The standards for determining unfitness because of physical disability or 
medical disqualification and the compensability of unfitting disabilities shall be uniform 
among the Services and between components within an individual Service. (See DoD 
Instruction 1332.38 (reference (e)).) 
3.8 Whe assignment of disability ratings shall be based on the Veterans 
Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities (VASRD) (reference (h)) as 
implemented by reference (e) and DoD Instruction 1332.39 (reference (f)). 
g^g^ STSP Service members who are otherwise eligible for, and who have the minimum 
number of years of service to qualify for, military retirement under any law in effect at 
the time of their physical disability evaluation, and who are pending separation for 
unfitness because of physical disability or medical disqualification, shall be afforded the 
opportunity to elect disability separation or to apply for, and, if approved, be retired for 
length of service. Further, the same opportunity shall be afforded members 
recommended for placement on or separation from the Temporary Disability Retired List 
(TDRL). 
3.10. A Service member shall be placed on the TDRL when the member meets the 
requirements for permanent disability retirement, except that the member's disability is 
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not determined to be stable. A disability "shall be determined to be stable when the. 
ptep0nderance of medical evidence indicates the severity of the conditio wilf^)Dably 
not^change within the next five years so as to warrant an increase or decrease in the 
dMlnlitf"rating percentage, + 
3.11. The TDRL shall be managed to meet the requirements under Chapter 61 of 10 
U.S.C. (reference (b)) for periodic physical examination, suspension of retired pay, and 
prompt removal from the TDRL. 
3.12. As an exception to general policy, the Secretary concerned, upon the request 
of the member or upon the exercise of discretion based on the needs of the Service, may 
continue in a permanent limited duty status either on active duty or in the Ready Reserve 
a member determined unfit because of physical disability when the member's service 
obligation or special skill and experience justifies such continuation. 
3.13. Service members referred for physical disability evaluation shall be afforded, 
at appropriate stages of processing, comprehensive counseling on the significance of the 
actions proposed and the related rights, entitlements, and benefits. 
3.14. The record of proceedings for members determined unfit shall include a 
recommendation or determination and supporting documentation on whether the 
member's disability meets the requirements under: 
3.14.1. 5 U.S.C. 3502, 5532, 6308, and 8332 (reference (c)) for entitlement to 
certain considerations or exemptions if subsequently employed under Federal Civil 
Service; and 
3.14.2. 26 U.S.C. 104 (reference (d)) for exclusion of disability compensation 
from Federal gross income for purposes of taxation. 
4. RESPONSIBILITIES 
4.1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, under the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shall: 
4.1.1. In coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 
Affairs (ASD(HA)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 
(ASD(RA)), develop and maintain a program of instruction for the DES. 
4.1.2. Monitor changes and proposed changes to military personnel and 
compensation statutes and DoD policy, and other pertinent authorities, to assess their 
impact on physical disability evaluation, Reserve component medical disqualification, 
and related benefits; and issue timely guidance to the Military Services, as appropriate. 
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4.1.3. Coordinate with the ASD(HA) and the ASD(RA) in developing policy 
for referral of members into the DES. 
4.1.4. Issue and maintain DoD Instruction 1332.38 (reference (e)). 
4.2. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, under the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shall: 
4.2.1. Monitor changes to the statutes, laws, and regulations of the Department 
of Veterans Affairs to assess their impact on the Department of Defense's application of 
the VASRD (reference (h)) to Service members determined unfit because of physical 
disability, and issue timely guidance to the Military Services, as appropriate, upon 
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. 
4.2.2. Develop and periodically review medical standards for referral of 
Service members into the DES. 
4.2.3. Recommend changes to and maintain DoD Instruction 1332.39 
(reference (f)). 
4.2.4. Monitor the medical element of the DES and propose corrective actions 
as required. 
4.2.5. Develop policies for the medical component of the DES, to include the 
establishment of minimum standards for Medical Evaluation Boards (MEBs), Reserve 
component medical examinations forwarded to Physical Evaluation Boards (PEBs), and 
TDRL periodic reexaminations. 
4.2.6. Develop and maintain a program of instruction for use by military 
treatment facilities on the preparation of MEBs for physical disability cases. 
4.2.7. Develop a program of instruction for use by PEB adjudicators and 
appellate review authorities on the medical aspects of physical disability adjudication, to 
include the application of the VASRD (reference (h)). 
4.2.8. Monitor the timeliness of the medical component of the DES. 
4.2.9. Develop policy for conduct of maximum interval physical examinations 
and certification of physical condition for members of the Reserve components. 
4.3. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, under the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shall ensure that policies for the DES 
are applicable to members of the Ready Reserve and those policies for the Ready Reserve 
are consistent with the policies established for active component personnel. 
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4.4. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall: 
4.4.1. Ensure compliance with Chapter 61 of 10 U.S.C. (reference (b)), this 
Directive, and Instructions and guidance issued under the authority of this Directive. 
4.4.2. Establish the Service-specific DES to consist of the four components 
designated in paragraph 3.2., above. 
4.4.3. Manage the Service-specific DES to ensure physical disability 
evaluation is accomplished in a timely manner with uniform application of the governing 
laws and DoD policy. 
4.4.4. Ensure that physicians who serve on MEBs are trained in the preparation 
of MEBs for physical disability evaluation. 
4.4.5. Ensure that PEB members and applicable review authorities are trained 
and certified in physical disability evaluation. 
4.4.6. Ensure all matters raising issues of fraud within the DES are investigated 
and resolved as appropriate. 
4.4.7. Defer a determination of disability retirement of any officer who is being 
processed for, is scheduled for, or has received non-disability retirement for age or length 
of service until such determination is approved by the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Personnel and Readiness) on the recommendation of the ASD(HA) under Section 
1216(b) of reference (b). 
5. EFFECTIVE DATE 
This Directive is effective immediately. 
John P. White' 
Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Enclosures -1 
El. References, continued 
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El. ENCLOSURE 1 
REFERENCES, continued 
(e) DoD Instruction 1332.38, "Physical Disability Evaluation," November 14,1996 
(f) DoD Instruction 1332.39, "Application of the Veterans Administration Schedule for 
Rating Disabilities," November 14,1996 
(g) Section 502(b) of title 37, United States Code 
(h) Title 38, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 4, "Veterans Administration Schedule 
for Rating Disabilities" 
7 ENCLOSURE 1 
Prepared by: 
Curtis J. Drake (0910) 
Stewart O. Peay (9584) 
Snell&Wilmer LLP. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association 
Third Judicial District 
By. MMSWWW 
APR - 7 2006 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 040924591 
Honorable L.A. Dever 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association's ("Educators") Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment ("Educators' Motion") and Joel Evans' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
("Evans' Motion") came on for regularly scheduled hearing on February 16, 2006 at 
approximately 11:00 a.m. Educators was represented by Stewart O. Peay and Mr. Evans was 
represented by Brian S. King and Nicole T. Durrant. Based upon the record evidence, 
memoranda and arguments of counsel, and for good cause shown: 
PEAYS\SLC\385776 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Educators' Motion is granted, in part, and denied in part. With respect to Mr. 
Evans5 cause of action that he is entitled to receive 100% of his salary for disability benefits 
received from Educators between January 2002 and January 2004, Educators' Motion is granted. 
The court finds that there are no material issues of disputed fact on this point. Mr. Evans failed 
to comply with the contractual requirements of the disability benefits policy administered by 
Educators for Salt Lake City Corporation (the "Plan"). Mr. Evans cannot attempt to recover 
under the Plan when he failed to comply with the Plan by failing to appeal within the 30 days 
required by the Plan. Therefore, his failure to abide by the Plan's dispute resolution process bars 
him from recovery under the Plan to this claim. 
2. Educators Motion is denied, in part, with respect to Mr. Evans' claim that he is 
entitled to disability benefits for the period after January 2004. Mr. Evans timely appealed 
Educators' decision to deny benefits after January 2004 but Educators has not notified Evans of 
its decision regarding that appeal. 
3. Mr. Evans' Motion is denied with respect to his claim that Educators erred in 
offsetting the benefits he was to receive under the Plan with those he was receiving from the 
Veterans' Administration. The court finds that there are issues of material fact on this issue. 
Specifically, whether the Plan is substantially similar to Utah Code Ann. § 49-21, et seq. 
4. Mr. Evans' Motion also petitioned this court for summary judgment on two other 
issues, namely, whether Mr. Evans became disabled in January 2002 as a result injuries sustained 
in the line of duty and whether Mr. Evans is totally and completely disabled from "any and all 
occupations" and is therefore entitled to disability benefits from Educators after January 2004. 
Mr. Evans' counsel, Mr. King, took the position at oral argument that he believed there were 
issues of material fact regarding these claims. Therefore, Mr. Evans Motion is denied with 
respect to these causes of action. 
PEAYS\SLC\385776 1 
DATED this V day of M t e h , 2006. WKftCh 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Curtis J. Drake 
Stewart 0 . Peay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association 
£•• s 
Brian S. King 
Nicole T. Durrant 
Counsel for Defendant and Counterclaimant Joel Evans: 
PEAYS\SLC\385776 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing ORDER was mailed, via first class mail, postage 
prepaid, on the ffi r%ay of March, 2006 to the following: 
Brian S. King 
Nicole T. Durrant 
336 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(T^fUm^-nJXtsy 
PEAYS\SLC\385776 1 
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J. WESLEY ROBINSON, #6321 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
Room 505, City and County Building 
451 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 535-7788 
Rktitt fci*j,,,^,* M O T 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 17 2006 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
JOEL EVANS, 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
v. 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Counterclaim Defendant, 
and 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Third Party Defendant. 
ORDER ON SALT LAKE CITY CORP.'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040924591 
JUDGE L.A. DEVER 
1 
DEC-0B-20U6 WhU U3JU9 PH THIRD D1ST, COURT FAX NO. 8012387407 P, 03 
This matter came before the Court on Third Party Defendant Salt Lake City 
Corporation's ("the City") Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant and Third 
Party Plaintiff Joel Evans ("Evans") filed a memorandum opposing the City's 
Motion, the City filed a Reply memorandum, and submitted the matter to the Court 
for decision. 
Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings and the relevant legal authorities, 
the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated June 10,2006. Consistent with that 
Minute Entry, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, DECREED AND ORDERED: 
1, The parties do not dispute that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.) does not apply to Evans' contract claims. 
However, to the extent that Evans has asserted any cause(s) of action that do not 
sound in contract, the City's motion is granted due to Evans' failure to file a notice of 
claim. 
2, The City's Long Term Disability Plans ("LTD Plan") governing this 
ease went into effect on July 1,2001 and June 30,2002, Because the administrative 
rules relied upon by Evans were either not enacted during the relevant time periods or 
do not apply vo th« relevant time periods, ihc arbitraiion provisions of the City's LTD 
Plan were consistent with and enforceable under the relevant Utah law and 
administrative rules. 
3, Based on the foregoing, the City's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
hereby GRANTED in its entirety. Evans' Third Party Complaint against the City is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2 
DEC-06-2006 WED 03:09 PM THIRD DIST, COURT FAX NO. 8012387407 K. 04 
DATED this V 1 day V I ortSne, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BRIAN S. KING 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Third Parly Plaintiff Joel Evans 
CURTIS J. DRAKE f / 
STEWART O. PEAY f J 
Attorneys for Plaintiff aria Counterclaim 
Defendant Educators Mutual Ins. Co. 
DATED: 
DATED: Uzo/06 
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ay-
M
^ 2 / 200? 
prepared by: 
Brian S.King, #4610 
Nicole T. Durrant, #8803 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1739 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1936 
brian@,briansking.com 
nicole(o),bri ansking.com 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant 
ORDER GRANTING EDUCATORS 
MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATIONS' 
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
JOEL EVANS, 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
and 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Case No. 040924591 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Third Party Defendant, 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association ("Educators") Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment-
("Educators' Renewed Motion") has been evaluated based on the record evidence, memoranda 
submitted by the parties and without oral argument. Now, based on this information and for good cause 
appearing, the Court rules as follows: 
Joel Evans did not provide supporting documentation in a timely manner in connection with his 
appeal as required by the terms of the Salt Lake City Corporation's Long Term Disability Insurance 
Program ("the Program"). Consequently, as to Evans' claim for long term disability benefits due to his 
inability to work in any occupation, the Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by the 
Plaintiff in this case is granted. 
However, based on the Court's earlier ruling, dated April 6, 2006, there remains the issue of 
whether Educators is entitled to offset from Evans' disability benefits payments made to him by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. The Court, by previous Order, ruled that whether the Program's terms 
were "substantially similar" to the requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 49-21 et seq., as required by 
U.C.A. § 49-21-201(6), was a question of fact that could not be resolved on summary judgment. 
The parties are directed to work together to establish a scheduling order for resolution of the 
remaining issues in the case. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 2007. 
Approved as to form: 
Curtis J. Drake 
Stewart O. Peay 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, 
AMENDED RULING 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
Case No.: 040924591 
vs. 
Judge: L A DEVER 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
Because the intent of the Court's position was not clear in the Ruling entered 
January 27, 2009, specifically the last paragraph, the Court STRIKES that Ruling and 
issues the following Amended Ruling. 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant's 
Request to Submit for Decision its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
November 28, 2008. Having reviewed Plaintiff's Motion and Defendant's Opposition 
thereto, the Court makes the following findings. 
Plaintiff's basis for its Renewed Motion is that in their original filings of cross-
motions for summary judgment, the parties relied on the incorrect governing statute. 
As a result of the parties' mutual error, this Court entered an Order on September 18, 
2008. Plaintiff now seeks relief from the Order pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 60(b). See 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation 
omitted) ("[A] motion under Rule 54(b) is a proper vehicle to ask the court to reconsider 
its prior denial of a motion for summary judgment"). 
Plaintiff maintains that the appropriate statute that should be considered is Utah 
Code Annotated Section 49-9-402 (2001 )\ because Defendant became disabled in 
October 2001. See Utah Constr. Co. v. Matheson. 534 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Utah 1975) 
("[T]he obligation to pay compensation is governed by the law at the time the injury 
occurred" (emphasis in original)). The parties originally relied on Section 49-21-402 
1
 Provides in relevant part: 
(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any amount 
received by, or due to, the employee from the following sources for the same 
period of time during which the employee is entitled to receive the monthly 
disability benefit: 
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by the employee, the 
employee's spouse, and the employee's dependent children, except that 
if Social Security benefits are increased to compensate for a change in 
the Consumer Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may not 
be further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits determined at the 
level in effect at the time of the commencement of benefits; 
(b) workers' compensation; 
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs] 
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs; 
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan providing disability 
income benefits for which contributions or payroll deductions are made by 
the employer; 
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or disability program for 
which the employee is eligible; 
(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a 
third party liable to the employee for the disability; and 
(h) unemployment compensation benefits. 
(emphasis added). 
2 
(2002)2. Therefore, relying on the 2001 statutory language, Plaintiff asserts that 
Defendant's benefits should be reduced by the amount Defendant was receiving from 
Veteran's Affairs, $8,510.78, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. 
Defendant argues that the 2002 version applies because (1) under the Group 
Long-Term Disability Plan ("Plan") Defendant had a twelve week elimination period 
which he was required to fulfill before receiving benefits and, (2) Defendant's employer, 
Salt Lake City Corporation, paid Defendant his full salary until June 2002, three months 
after the effective date of the 2002 statute. Furthermore, Defendant claims that 
pursuant to the law of the case doctrine this Court has discretionary power to decline or 
reopen a matter before final judgment. See IHC v. D&KMqmt., Inc., 2008 UT 36, TJ27, 
606 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 ("[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, 'a decision made on an 
issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation/ 
(footnote omitted). Thus, the doctrine allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the 
same case once the court has ruled on them. In this way, the law of the case doctrine 
2
 Provides in relevant part: 
(2) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or payable to, the 
eligible employee from the following sources for the same period of time during which the eligible 
employee is entitled to receive a monthly disability benefit: 
(a) Social Security disability benefits, including all benefits received by the eligible 
employee, the eligible employee's spouse, and the eligible employee's dependent 
children; 
(b) workers' compensation indemnity benefits; 
(c) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a third party liable to 
the employee for the disability; 
(d) unemployment compensation benefits; 
(e) automobile no-fault, medical payments, or simitar insurance payments; and 
(f) any other disability benefits resulting from the disability for which benefits are being 
received under this chapter. 
(emphasis added). 
3 
acts much like the doctrine of res judicata-furthering the goals of judicial economy and 
finality—but within a single case"). 
In amending the 2001 statute, the Utah State Legislature was clear that its goal 
was not to modify the outlined benefits, rather it was to clarify the language. H.B. 250, 
54th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2002). Even if the Court were to disregard the General 
Session information, reading the 2001 and 2002 statutes, the language of the statues is 
consistent. 
Because the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit a court from correcting an 
error, Trembly. 884 P.2d at 1311, the Court STRIKES its Order of September 18, 2008. 
Additionally, if Defendant was receiving benefits from Veteran's Affairs while he was 
also receiving benefits under the Plan, Plaintiff is entitled to have that amount offset. 
The Court initially Ordered Defendant to submit any information of a separate 
disability within ten (10) days of entry of the Ruling entered January 27, 2009. The 
implication of the initial order was that if Defendant had two separate disabilities then it 
was acceptable to receive benefits under the Plan, in addition to the benefits Defendant 
was receiving from Veteran's Affairs. That was not the intent of the Court's Order. 
Such a concept was not before the Court for consideration. 
Because the issue before the Court was which version of the statute was 
applicable to the matter, the Court's Order was premised on the fact that if the 
Defendant had a disability which arose after the amendment date then the Court would 
consider the amended statute in its review. However, since the Court finds that both the 
intent of the 2001 and 2002 versions of the statutes are consistent, i.e., benefits 
4 
received from an "armed services or disability program" may be offset against any 
disability benefits paid pursuant to the Plan, the Court enters Plaintiff's Proposed Order 
as the correct interpretation of the Court's ruling. 
Dated this 20th day of May, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
LADEVER ~ : ~' 77HI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE v~ 1 ' A * ® 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling dated this 
20th day of May, 2009, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Curtis J. Drake 
Stewart 0. Peay 
Snell & Wilmer, LLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Brian S. King 
Brian S. King Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
CLERK OF COURT 
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